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Cet article examine une économie intertemporelle avec contraintes de
liquidité. Celles-ci empêchent la monétisation des revenus futurs et génèrent une
incomplétude endogène des marchés financiers. En contraste avec la littérature
récente sur les contraintes d'investissement, nos contraintes de liquidité émergent
naturellement lorsque les agents peuvent déclarer faillite et ont un horizon fini. Un
individu, dont la contrainte de liquidité sature, decide optimalement (i) de déférer
sa consommation en période de jeunesse, mais (ii) de l'augmenter lorsque la
contrainte est active. Le taux d'intérêt et les prix des actifs financiers d'équilibre
sont caractérisés sous des conditions générales sur les préférences et les dotations.
En présence de contraintes de liquidité le rendement de l'actif non risqué décroît.
De plus le CAPM par rapport à la consommation est valide, même lorsque la
structure de base du marché est incomplète. Lorsque l'aversion relative par rapport
au risque est homogène et constante l'incomplétude du marché renforce l'effet des
contraintes de liquidité et réduit encore davantage le rendement non risqué.
Cependant, ni la contrainte d'incomplétude, ni celles de liquidité ne nous permettent
d'expliquer le niveau empirique du ratio de Sharpe pour des valeurs raisonables du
taux d'aversion au risque. D'autres contributions de cet article comprennent (i) une
caractérisation nouvelle du problème de consommation-portefeuille d'un individu
sous contrainte conduisant a une solution explicite, (ii) une approche constructive
de détermination de l'équilibre, et (iii) une procédure numérique qui nous permet
d'aborder les problèmes de calcul qui se posent dans ce contexte.
We consider an intertemporal economy with liquidity constrained and
unconstrained individuals. A liquidity constraint prevents marketability of future
income and thus endogenously generates market incompleteness. In contrast with
the existing literature on portfolio constraints, our liquidity constraints arise
naturally whenever agents may default and have a finite horizon. Liquidity
constrained individuals optimally (i) postpone consumption in early age and (ii)
experience permanent consumption increases whenever the constraint binds. The
equilibrium interest rate and asset prices are characterized under very general
assumptions on preferences and endowment processes. In the presence of liquidity
constraints, the cumulative interest return is reduced. In addition, the CCAPM
holds, even when the basic market structure is incomplete. With homogeneous
relative risk aversion market incompleteness reinforces the effect of liquidity
constraints and further reduces the riskless return. However, we show that neither
incompleteness nor liquidity constraints can explain the empirical magnitude of the
Sharpe ratio for admissible levels of risk aversion, independently of preferences
and endowment assumptions. Additional contributions of the paper include (i) a
new characterization of the consumption-portfolio problem of constrained
individuals leading to an explicit solution, (ii) a constructive approach to the
determination of equilibrium, and (iii) a numerical procedure to handle the
forward-backward path-dependent computational problem arising with a liquidity
constraint.
Mots Clés : Équilibre, contraintes de liquidité, marchés incomplets,
hétérogénéité, consommation, taux d'intérêt, prime de risque du
marché, inégalité différentielle stochastique récursive, méthode
numérique
Keywords : Equilibrium, liquidity constraints, incomplete markets,
heterogeneity, consumption, interest rate, equity premium,
backward stochastic differential inequality, numerical method
1 Introduction.
Intertemporal economies with frictionless security markets have been extensively studied in -
nancial economics. Early contributions by Merton (1973) and Breeden (1979) have identied
the structure of equilibrium prices and interest rates in the context of Markovian economies.
Extensions by Due and Huang (1985), Due (1986) and Due and Zame (1989) have consid-
ered complete markets with more general uncertainty structure and drawn the connection with
Arrow-Debreu equilibria. Consumption and portfolio policies of agents are also well understood.
Closed form solutions have been obtained for a class of Markovian models (Merton (1971)) and
models with Brownian ltrations and complete markets (Cox and Huang (1989, 1991), Karatzas,
Lehoczky and Shreve (1987)), while detailed characterizations are available when markets are
incomplete (Karatzas, Lehoczky, Shreve and Xu (1991), He and Pearson (1991)) or in the pres-
ence of portfolio constraints (Cvitanic and Karatzas (1993), Cuoco (1997)). However, little is
known about the impact on the consumption-portfolio policies and equilibrium of another type of
constraints which impinges on the intertemporal allocation of risks of most investors in nancial
markets, namely liquidity constraints. These constraints introduce a form of market incomplete-
ness which is markedly dierent from the situation created by the type of portfolio constraints
considered in the literature so far.
A liquidity constraint arises as a result of the restriction to borrow against one's future income.
Labor income is a typical example of an endowment stream that, in general, cannot be marketed
due to moral hazard reasons or due to observability but non-veriability of the idiosyncratic
payment stream. However, unlike previous attempts which capture this situation by introducing
ad-hoc limits on short-sales for specic assets (for example, Constantinides et. al (1997), Basak
and Cuoco (1997)), we only constrain the value of the marketable assets of an individual to be
nonnegative at all times. This is equivalent to the requirement that any short position has to
be fully collateralized with marketable assets. While this constraint is automatically satised by
placing a nonnegativity constraint on consumption when the endowment consists exclusively of
an initial lump-sum of money, it is not satised when income is received throughout lifetime.
Thus, unlike the complete markets case, whenever there are liquidity constraints the timing of
labor income payments matters for consumption and portfolio choice.
Early results on the impact of similar wealth constraints on the consumption-portfolio prob-
lem were provided by Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), He and Pages (1991) and Hindy (1995).
In independent work, a control problem similar to ours is posed as a stopping time problem
in El Karoui and Jeanblanc-Picque (1997). Also, the consumption-portfolio problem studied in
the macroeconomics literature on \buer-stock" models arising from Deaton (1991), can be ob-
tained as a special case of our formulation when agents are only allowed to trade a riskless asset.
However, the nature and properties of the solution, characterized by the path-dependency of the
consumption and portfolio choices, have not been identied in previous work. In addition, the
analysis of the impact of liquidity constraints on equilibrium prices and allocations has not been
considered in the literature either.
Our liquidity constraint formulation can be rationalized as follows: imagine an economy in
which an agent can default at any time. Suppose that there is a costless technology available
that tracks the credit history of individuals (a credit bureau). In addition, purchases and sales
are anonymous but short sales are not. Short-sales can be collateralized but, for moral hazard
reasons, only traded assets are acceptable as collateral (thus, an agent cannot pledge his future
labor income as collateral). If an agent defaults (i.e. walks away from any short position in
any traded asset), he is not be able to borrow (set up a short position) thereafter any more.
1
Lastly, suppose also that all agents have a nite lifetime horizon T. Now, if an agent is short
1
This is dierent from the analysis in Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Alvarez and Jermann (1997), in which if an
agent defaults, he is thereafter not allowed to take both long and short positions in asset markets. In our framework,
long positions cannot be prevented after default because trade in asset markets is anonymous.
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in some asset at T-1, he will simply not settle his short position at period T (i.e. default is
optimal at T). Thus, nobody would be willing to let him take a short position on any asset at
T-1 unless he pledges enough collateral to cover this short position. At T-2, the agent knows
that he will not be able to set up an uncollateralized short position at T-1 and therefore has no
incentive to protect his credit history: he will optimally default at T-1 on any uncollateralized
short position established at T-2. But anticipating that, other agents will then not allow him to
establish an uncollateralized short position at T-2. By induction this argument holds at all times.
As a result, any short position taken at any time must be fully collateralized with marketable
assets, or equivalently liquid wealth must be nonnegative at all times (where by liquid wealth we
understand the net value of the portfolio of traded assets of an individual).
More generally all cash ows that are under some form of control by agents enjoy limited mar-
ketability and are naturally subject to liquidity constraints. Thus, future inows of idiosyncratic
income cannot be part of liquid wealth until they are eectively cashed. Liquidity constraints will
thus restrict the ability of agents to smoothe their consumption prole by placing a lower bound
on the value of their liquid wealth. This form of constraint is then substantially distinct from
incomplete markets or portfolio constraints examined in the earlier literature.
In this paper we solve the consumption-portfolio problem and derive equilibrium prices in the
presence of liquidity constraints. Our approach to the consumption-portfolio problem is construc-
tive. We rst show that the problem can be approached by introducing a suitable correction to
state prices which solves a forward-backward inequality, and then we provide a characterization
of the solution in terms of a purely backward inequality. This reformulation is of interest since (i)
the existence of a solution to the backward inequality can be demonstrated and (ii) the backward
inequality lends itself easily to numerical computations. The consumption policy is then obtained
in closed form in terms of the corrected state price density.
Our continuous time formulation of the problem has advantages that go beyond mathematical
convenience. In a discrete time economy in which asset prices have unbounded support, agents
could never take short positions in risky assets since the constraint has to be met at all times with
probability one. This is overly restrictive since it prevents even the very wealthy individuals from
engaging in any short-selling activity at all times. Such pathologies are avoided in a continuous
time framework because liquid wealth is a continuous process. The liquidity constraint is thus
truly endogenized in the sense that individuals are free to choose any portfolio they wish as long
as they remain solvent. Thus, no ad-hoc constraints on portfolio choices are required to model
non-traded labor income.
Consumption behavior in the presence of a liquidity constraint has a priori surprising and
economically interesting properties. The analysis of the control problem shows that the liquidity
constraint is in fact a direct constraint on the consumption prole of an individual as opposed to
a constraint on his/her portfolio policy. The implications for equilibrium are therefore radically
dierent from those of models with portfolio constraints. This constraint induces an individual
to shift consumption from the present to the future, uniformly across states of nature. Thus,
consumption is deferred in early age while the agent builds up his liquid wealth. At later stages
of the lifecycle, the individual compensates by consuming more than in the standard frictionless
model with identical nancial market. The deferral of consumption in early age ensures that the
liquidity constraint can be met at all subsequent times. The pattern of consumption deferral
also exhibits interesting and albeit counterintuitive properties. The liquidity constraint is more
likely to be binding when the individual experiences positive income shocks. At these times, the
individual wishes to transfer resources to less favorable states of nature and thereby run liquidity
decits. Since the constraint precludes this it induces an increase in consumption. Furthermore
since the marginal utility of accumulated wealth is lowered along all possible future trajectories
of the economy this increase in consumption is permanent. Successive occurrences of a binding
liquidity constraint will be accompanied by successive permanent increases in consumption. This
2
reects the fact that the liquidity constraint induces a segmentation of the state space that
prevents the agent from equalizing marginal utilities to state-price ratios uniformly across states
of nature.
We show that one can characterize equilibrium prices in our economy through a representa-
tive agent formulation even though the competitive equilibrium is not Pareto Optimal. With this
characterization, we show that the equity premium satises the standard consumption CAPM.
However, the liquidity constraint plays a role in the determination of expected returns since it
aects the relative risk aversion parameter of the aggregator in the economy, which is a compos-
ite of the agents' risk aversions and depends on the distribution of consumption across agents.
Since constrained individuals defer consumption in the early stages of life, the distribution of
consumption is shifted toward unconstrained agents. The Sharpe ratio of the stock market unam-
biguously increases whenever aggregate risk aversion is a decreasing function of the consumption
share of constrained individuals. We provide simple conditions under which this holds. Liquidity
constraints, however, are unable to rationalize the empirical magnitude of the Sharpe ratio.
The cumulative equilibrium interest return bears the full direct impact of the constraint,
while the risk premium of the stock reects the constraint through the consumption allocation.
In equilibrium, the cumulative interest return has two components. The rst is a locally riskless
interest rate r which has the familiar structure: it is positively related to the expected consumption
growth rate and negatively related to the aggregate consumption risk if the aggregator exhibits
positive prudence. The second is a nonincreasing, singular component A which is tied to the
occurrence of a binding liquidity constraint. As mentioned above, whenever the constraint binds
on an agent, his consumption demand experiences a permanent increase. Since the agent is
prevented from borrowing, but not lending, at that time, the equilibrium interest rate must be
lower than it would otherwise be. The yield to maturity on any short term bond will then have a
tendency to decrease relative to an unconstrained economy.
2
Accounting for liquidity constraints
in asset pricing models may then help to resolve the riskfree rate puzzle (Weil (1990)).
Liquidity constraints have a similar impact on equilibrium when the basic market structure is
incomplete. In such an environment the liquidity constraint reduces the riskless return and fails
to impact the structure of the Sharpe ratio. Market incompleteness also has a direct eect on the
riskless return but none on the structure of the Sharpe ratio. In economies populated by individ-
uals with homogeneous constant relative risk aversion market incompleteness reinforces the eect
of liquidity constraints and further reduces the riskless return. However, neither incompleteness
nor liquidity constraints can be invoked to explain the magnitude of the Sharpe ratio.
The next section of the paper provides an intuitive example to motivate the relevance of liquid-
ity constraints. Section 2 details the structure of the economy. Section 3 solves the consumption-
portfolio problem in the presence of a liquidity constraint; the economic behavior of optimal
consumption is analyzed and further intuitions are provided in the context of the example devel-
oped in the introduction. In section 4 we develop a constructive approach to the determination
of equilibrium and investigate the properties of the interest rate and the equity premium. Section
5 extends some results to incomplete markets. All proofs are contained in the Appendix.
1.1 An example.
To illustrate the nature of the constraints that we investigate in this paper, we rst solve an
example for the consumption-portfolio problem of an unconstrained agent in a standard complete-
markets framework. Consider the \binomial" tree economy with one stock and one bond and an
investor with power preferences and a risk aversion coecient equal to 3. The investor is endowed
only with a stream of labor income. The following lattice describes the evolution of the stock
2
This holds if there is no osetting eect due to a redistribution of consumption aecting the risk aversion of
the aggregator. Constant and homogeneous relative risk aversion across agents is a sucient condition for the
unambiguous decrease in short term interest rates.
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price (which is denoted by S), the endowment of the agent (denoted by e), and the state-price
density (denoted by ): Recall that the process  makes 
t
S
t
a martingale. Each time step in the
lattice corresponds to one year. The implicit continuously-compounded interest rate is constant
and equal to 5% per year. The probability of an up-movement in the lattice is constant and equal
to 0:6545. Time periods are t = 0; 1; 2.
e
uu
= 2:5495
S
uu
= 1:5

uu
= 0:5488
e
u
= 1:5967
S
u
= 1:1937

u
= 0:7408
%
&
e = 1
S = 1
 = 1
%
&
e
ud
= 1:16
S
ud
= 1

ud
= 1
e
d
= 0:8496
S
d
= 0:9032

d
= 1:3499
%
&
e
dd
= 0:7219
S
dd
= 0:8970

dd
= 1:8222
The continuous-time limit of this economy corresponds to a diusion economy with lognor-
mally distributed stock returns with Sharpe ratio equal to 0:3, and a continuously compounded
interest rate of 5%. The individual has a labor income stream whose expected growth rate is
higher when he is young: the expected growth rate is 10% in period zero, and 2:45% on average
in period one. In addition, the standard deviation of labor income is 30% in period zero, 37% in
period one in the up-state and 23% in period one in the down-state.
In this economy, the investor attempts to maximize his lifetime utility of consumption
E
 
2
X
t=0
1
1, 3
c
1 3
t
!
(1)
by choosing a nonnegative consumption process c and a trading strategy that species the number
of shares of the stock to hold () and the number of one-period, $1 face value zero-coupon bonds
to hold (B) at each node in the tree. The trading strategy is constrained to be self-nancing in
that

t+1
S
t
+B
t+1
= 
t
S
t
+B
t
exp (r) + e
t
, c
t
(2)
for t = 0; 1 with 
0
= B
0
= 0:
Since markets are complete and by standard arguments, rather than choosing c,  and B that
maximize (1) subject to (2), the agent can solve the consumption-portfolio choice problem just by
choosing the consumption process c that maximizes (1) subject to the single budget constraint:
E
 
2
X
t=0

t
c
t
!
= E
 
2
X
t=0

t
e
t
!
(3)
The nancing portfolio can then be obtained by recursive computation along the tree given the
optimal consumption process.
The following tree shows the evolution of optimal consumption (c), optimal stock and bond
holdings at the end of each period, after retrade ( and B respectively) and the agent's wealth
at the beginning of each period (X). The Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint (3) is
0:5784:
4
cuu
= 1:4659
X
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= ,1:0836
c
u
= 1:3264
X
u
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
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B
u
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%
&
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%
&
c
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X
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c
d
= 1:0860
X
d
= 0:3776

d
= ,2:1408
B
d
= 2:181
%
&
c
ud
= 0:9826
X
dd
= 0:2607
The portfolio of securities serves to nance future consumption in excess of the endowment
(net consumption). At nodes (u) and (uu), the portfolio at the beginning of the period has a
negative value: the agent is borrowing against his future labor income. For example, at the
beginning of the third period at node uu, the individual owes 1:0836; which is the value at the
beginning of the third period of the portfolio that was chosen at the end of the second period. In
the standard, default-free Arrow-Debreu setting, he would settle this debt at the end of the third
period using the excess of his endowment (2:5495) over his consumption (1:4659) at that node.
Note, however, that the above program presumes that the individual never defaults on his debt.
But, if income at node uu cannot be fully appropriated by any creditor, the individual would prefer
to default and consume 2:5495 rather than settle his short position and only consume 1:4659. As
a result his labor income will not be accepted as collateral by anyone who might consider taking
the opposite side of his short portfolio position. It is then not possible for the individual to
enter node (uu) with negative liquidity in the rst place, i.e. the anticipation of possible rational
default precludes negative portfolio values. The same reasoning applies at prior nodes of the tree,
in particular at node u in period 2. Thus, we would like to solve the consumption-portfolio choice
problem when liquid wealth X is constrained to be nonnegative at all times. In other words we
want to constrain the individual not to dispose of his labor income until it is cashed. This is
in sharp contrast to the standard complete markets solution in which the individual is able to
sell his lifetime labor income up-front if he wishes to do so. In section 3 we develop the solution
procedure in the presence of such a liquidity constraint; we revert to the numerical example above
in section 3.5.
2 The economy.
We consider an intertemporal economy with nite horizon [0; T ] and two types of agents described
below. The uncertainty is represented by a complete probability space (
;F), a probability
measure P , a unidimensional Wiener process W dened on (
;F) and a ltration F
()
. We
assume that F
()
is the natural ltration generated by W and take F
T
= F :
2.1 Financial markets.
A stock and a riskless asset are traded in nancial markets (none of the results of this paper
depends on the existence of a single stock). There is no outside supply of this asset, and there is
only one share of the stock outstanding. The stock pays dividends D such that
dD
t
= D
t
[
D
t
dt+ 
D
t
dW
t
]; D
0
given.
where 
D
and 
D
are progressively measurable processes representing the drift and volatility of
the dividend process. The stock price satises
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dS
t
+D
t
dt = S
t
[dm
t
+ 
t
dW
t
] (4)
dm
t
= 
t
dt+ dA
t
(5)
subject to some initial value S
0
, where m and  are F
()
-progressively measurable processes. The
coecient m represents the cumulative drift of the stock price; it is composed of an instantaneous
drift  and a nonincreasing, singular process A which is null at time 0. As we will show later,
the presence of liquidity constraints implies the emergence of such singular terms in equilibrium.
The evolution of the riskless asset price B is governed by the equation dB
t
=B
t
= dR
t
where
dR
t
= r
t
dt+ dA
t
(6)
and where r is an instantaneous rate of interest and A is the singular component introduced
above. This formulation is adopted from the start because we will prove later that the singular
components in the stock and bond prices are necessarily identical in equilibrium: since our ul-
timate goal is to understand the structure of equilibrium we focus on the class of interest rate
and stock price processes which are most relevant from that point of view. The initial value S
0
,
the coecients (m;;A; ), and the values of B and r are endogenous processes. To simplify
notation, we dene the discount factor
b
t
= exp

,
Z
t
0
dR
s

: (7)
The value of a money market account, or a dollar continuously reinvested at the riskless spot
interest rate, is 1=b
t
. Taking the dierence between the expected gross returns on the stock
and the riskless asset and dividing by the stock price volatility gives the market price of risk
 = 
 1
( , r). Though our economy presents incompleteness due to liquidity constraints, a
unique equilibrium state price density will still exist.
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We will therefore maintain the following
standard assumption which will enable us to solve the agents' consumption-portfolio problems.
Assumption 1: The market price of risk  satises E exp

1
2
R
T
0
k
t
k
2
dt

<1.
As we shall demonstrate this condition is satised in equilibrium under mild conditions: the
class of relevant price processes is then the one satisfying (4), (6) along with Assumption 1. The
corresponding state price density process (SPD) is

t
= b
t
exp

,
Z
t
0

s
dW
s
,
1
2
Z
t
0
(
s
)
2
ds

: (8)
and the Arrow-Debreu prices implicit in this market structure are 
t
dP .
2.2 Agents.
The consumption space is the set of nonnegative, progressively measurable processes which satisfy
the integrability condition,
R
T
0
c
i
t
dt <1, a:s:, and such that utility (9) is nite. Agents have von
Neuman-Morgenstern preferences dened on this space by
U
i
(c) = E

Z
T
0
u
i
(c
t
; t)dt

(9)
3
The market structure (4)-(6) is consistent with the absence of arbitrage opportunities (see Karatzas, Lehoczky
and Shreve (1991)). An interpretation of the equilibrium state price density as the marginal utility of a representative
agent in a Pareto-inecient (constrained) equilibrium will be given below.
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i = 1; :::; I. Let u
i
c
 @u
i
=@x denote the marginal utility of consumption. The following assump-
tions are standard.
Assumption 2: For each i and for all t 2 [0; T ]
(i) u
i
(; t) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously dierentiable:
(ii) lim
x!0
u
i
c
(x; t) =1; lim
x!1
u
i
c
(x; t) = 0:
Each agent is endowed with an income process e
i
which is a nonnegative and integrable
F
()
-progressively measurable process. Initial endowments of shares of the stock are n
i
where
P
i
n
i
= 1. Initial endowments of the riskless asset are null.
Each agent chooses a consumption process c
i
and a portfolio process 
i
which represents his
stock demand. The portfolio is a progressively measurable process which satises the integrability
condition
R
T
0

i
t
(
t
, r
t
)dt +
R
T
0
(
i
t

t
)
2
dt < 1, a:s:. The admissible choice set for c
i
and 
i
will
be specied below. The liquid wealth of an individual is the value of his portfolio of marketed
assets: for a policy (c
i
; 
i
) the liquid wealth process X
i
satises
dX
i
t
= X
i
t
dR
t
+
 
e
i
t
, c
i
t

dt+ 
i
t
[(
t
, r
t
)dt+ 
t
dW
t
] (10)
subject to the initial condition X
i
0
= n
i
S
0
.
Individuals are divided into two categories depending on whether their income stream can
be marketed or not. Recall that by \marketing" the labor income stream we mean using the
future idiosyncratic income as collateral for today's aggregate short position. The set of all agents
is I = C [ U where C is the set of constrained agents (agents of type 1) and U is the set of
unconstrained agents (type 2). An example of an agent of type U is an individual who inherits a
claim to an exogenous production process (say, a rm); a typical individual of type C is someone
who only has a claim towards the income produced by his eort. The income of constrained agents
C must be either consumed or invested in marketed assets as it is obtained. Unconstrained agents
can trade the stock and the riskless asset without restriction: markets are dynamically complete
from their point of view. We naturally assume C \ U = ;:
A consumption-portfolio policy
 
c
i
; 
i

is admissible for agent i if and only if the wealth process
generated by
 
c
i
; 
i

satises
(

t
X
i
t
+E

R
T
t

s
e
i
s
ds j F
t

 0 8t 2 [0; T ] if i 2 U
X
i
t
 0 8t 2 [0; T ] if i 2 C
(11)
Let A
i
be the admissible set for i 2 C [U . Condition (11) states that a liquidity-constrained
individual has to limit his consumption-portfolio choice to policies that ensure the nonnegativity
of his liquid wealth (i.e. the value of his marketed assets) at all times and with probability one.
On the other hand, an unconstrained individual can run temporary decits in his liquid wealth
position as long as his total wealth is nonnegative. Here total wealth equals liquid wealth plus
the current value of his endowment stream. We can then say that the constrained individual
faces a liquidity constraint while the unconstrained individual faces a solvency constraint. For
later purposes, we shall record a useful property of the liquid wealth process generated by an
admissible (c
i
; 
i
).
Lemma 1 Let
 
c
i
; 
i

2 A
i
for i 2 C [ U . The liquid wealth process X
i
generated by (c
i
; 
i
)
satises the lower bound

t
X
i
t
 E


T
X
i
T
+
Z
T
t

s
(c
i
s
, e
i
s
)ds j F
t

: (12)
This condition says that liquid wealth corresponding to an admissible policy cannot be less
than the present value of future net consumption where valuation is based on the SPD . A pair
 
c
i
; 
i

2 A
i
is optimal for agent i if and only if there is no other admissible pair (
0
; c
0
) such that
U
i
(c
0
) > U
i
(c
i
).
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2.3 Denition of equilibrium.
Let E denote the economy described above. A competitive equilibrium for E is a collection of
stochastic processes ((c
i
; 
i
)
i2C[U
; (S; ;A; ); r) such that (i)
 
c
i
; 
i

is optimal for U
i
; i 2 C[U ,
(ii) markets clear: (a) commodity market:
P
i
c
i
=
P
i
e
i
 e, (b) stock market:
P
i

i
= S, (c)
riskless asset market:
P
i
(
i
,X
i
) = 0.
3 Optimal consumption-portfolio policies.
In this section we rst describe an equivalent static consumption choice problem for a constrained
agent (section 3.1). We then derive the optimal consumption policy (section 3.2), discuss con-
sumption behavior (section 3.3), characterize the shadow price of the liquidity constraint (section
3.4) and provide numerical computation of the solution that allows and further economic intu-
ition regarding the agent's lifetime consumption prole (section 3.5). To simplify notation we
omit superscripts i throughout the section.
3.1 Static optimization with a liquidity constraint.
It is well known that the dynamic consumption-portfolio problem of an unconstrained agent is
related to a static problem involving consumption choice only (Cox and Huang (1989), Karatzas,
Lehoczky and Shreve (1987)). We examine this relation in the presence of a liquidity constraint
The dynamic problem of a liquidity constrained individual is
sup
(c;)
U(c) s:t: (c; ) 2 A (13)
In order to formulate the static problem we recall that liquid wealth is bounded below by
the present value of net consumption (12). Nonsatiation of preferences implies the following
strenghtening of lemma 1
Lemma 2 If the utility function is strictly increasing liquid wealth satises

t
X
i
t
= E

Z
T
t

s
(c
i
s
, e
i
s
)ds j F
t

(14)
Consider then the static problem
sup
c
U(c) s:t (15)
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
c  0, progressively measurable and integrable
X
t
= E

R
T
t

s
(c
s
, e
s
)ds j F
t

 0 t 2 [0; T ]
E

R
T
0

t
(c
t
, e
t
)dt

= nS
0
(16)
The following proposition establishes the relationship between problems (13) and (15).
Proposition 3 Assume that u satises the conditions of assumption 1. If (c; ) solves the dy-
namic problem (13), then c solves the static problem (15)-(16). Conversely, if c solves the static
problem (15)-(16), then there exists a portfolio policy  such that (c; ) solves the dynamic problem
(13). Furthermore

t
= X
t
(
0
t
)
 1

t
+ 
 1
t
(
0
t
)
 1

t
(17)
where  is the unique, progressively measurable process in the representation of the martingale
M
t
 E

Z
T
0

s
(c
s
, e
s
)ds j F
t

,E

Z
T
0

s
(c
s
, e
s
)ds

: (18)
8
3.2 The optimal consumption policy.
The Lagrangian for the constrained static optimization problem is:
sup
c
inf
y;
U(c) + yE

x,
Z
T
0

t
(c
t
, e
t
)dt

+E

Z
T
0
E

Z
T
t

s
(c
s
, e
s
)ds j F
t

d
t

(19)
subject to c  0; y  0 and d  0. Here y is the multiplier for the static budget constraint
and d the multiplier for the liquidity constraint. Since the liquidity constraint must be satised
at any time and in any state the multiplier d is a stochastic process. Furthermore,  must
be predictable and nondecreasing. This formulation is an application of optimization theory in
innite dimensional vector spaces (see details in Appendix B).
The Lagrangian (19) leads to the following rst order conditions
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
u
c
(c
t
; t) = (y , 
t
)
t
E

Z
T
0

t
(c
t
, e
t
)dt

= nS
0
E

Z
T
t

s
(c
s
, e
s
)ds j F
t

 0
E

Z
T
0
X
t
d
t

= 0
c
t
 0; y  0
  0;nondecreasing, null at 0:
(20)
The rst equation states the usual equality of the marginal utility of consumption and of the
state price density, accounting for the shadow prices of the constraints. The next two conditions
correspond to the budget and liquidity constraints, respectively. The fourth condition is the
complementary slackness condition: when the constraint is slack (X
t
> 0) the multiplier is null
(d
t
= 0); when the multiplier charges (d
t
> 0) the constraint is binding (X
t
= 0). The last two
sets of conditions are nonnegativity constraints on the control variables.
Our next result is a verication theorem which shows that the conditions (20) above are
sucient for the static optimization problem.
Theorem 4 Suppose that there exist progressively measurable processes (c; ) and a constant y
such that (c; ; y) solves (20). Then c solves (15) subject to (16).
A consequence of Theorem 4 is that we can focus on the conditions (20) to solve the static
problem and identify the optimal consumption policy. This task is carried out in section 3.4.
4
Remark 1 The rst order conditions (20) also reveal that the optimal consumption of the con-
strained agent coincides with the consumption plan that he would choose in an articial \shadow"
economy without liquidity constraint, but in which the state price density is given by (y , )
rather than . Since 
t
is a nondecreasing process, this \shadow" economy can be interpreted as
the original economy but with a new riskfree return that experiences increases at selected times.
In order to get the same consumption and wealth path in this articial unconstrained economy,
the riskfree return has to increase just enough to discourage the agent to run uncovered short
4
Results on the existence of a solution (though not a constructive derivation of the solution) appear in Pages
(1989). He shows that an optimum to (15)-(16) exists if (i) the utility function is bounded, or if (ii) it is positive
and there exists constants a; b > 0; 0 < p < 1 such that u(x; t)  a+ bx
p
, or (iii) it is unbounded and there exist
constants a; a
0
; b > 0; b
0
> 0; p < 1; p
0
< 0 such that a
0
  b
0
x
p
0
 u(x; T )  u(x; 0)  a+ bx
p
.
Note that these sucient conditions for existence are satised by power utility functions with a relative risk
aversion dierent from one. The constructive derivation of the optimal policy that we carry out in section 3.4 does
not require such restrictions on utility functions.
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positions at times when he would otherwise like to do so. Note however, that this reinterpretation
of the model might be misleading: as we show later the liquidity constraint will actually lower the
equilibrium riskfree return relative to an economy without liquidity constraint.
3.3 Consumption behavior with a liquidity constraint.
As the previous example shows, a wealth constrained individual exhibits a consumption behavior
which departs signicantly from the standard unconstrained case. Let I(y; t) = inffx  0 :
u
c
(x; t)  yg denote the left-inverse of the marginal utility of consumption. The rst order
condition in (20) yields the optimal consumption policy
c
t
= I((y , 
t
)
t
):
Risk aversion implies that the inverse marginal utility I() is strictly decreasing. Since  is a
nondecreasing process, we conclude that the multiplier y which solves the static budget constraint
E

Z
T
0

t
(I((y , 
t
)
t
), e
t
)dt

= nS
0
exceeds the multiplier which would prevail in the absence of a wealth constraint. As explained
earlier, the process  captures the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution between two
time periods and the ratio of the state-prices corresponding to these states. The former will be
smaller than the latter since the agent cannot borrow. The fact that  only increases at times when
the constraint binds also means that the multiplier  reects the anticipation of occurrence of
future constrained states. Since the process  is null at zero, we also deduce that the agent reduces
consumption in early age while increasing it at later stages in his life: early age corresponds to a
period of buer wealth buildup. The anticipation of future constrained states is the source of his
conservative behavior at the outset. This optimal policy is radically dierent from the \naive"
intuition suggesting that the individual starts o his consumption policy at levels more or less
equal to the ones in the unconstrained case, and then readjusts his consumption downward when
\bad times" occur in order to accumulate income, build up wealth and loosen the constraint.
Another striking dierence with the standard consumption behavior is the presence of a sin-
gular component in the evolution of the consumption function. Indeed, applying Ito's lemma to
the optimal consumption process gives
dc
t
c
t
=
1
R
R
t

P
t
R
R
t


2
t
+

u
t
u
c

dt+
1
R
R
t
 
dR
t
+ (y , 
t
)
 1
d
t

,
1
R
R
t

t
dz
t
where R
R
= ,
cu
cc
u
c
denotes the relative risk aversion coecient and P = ,
cu
ccc
u
cc
is the relative
prudence coecient. The volatility of consumption has the same structure as in the standard
model. The drift coecient, however, has the additional term (R
R
)
 1
(y,
t
)
 1
d
t
relative to the
unconstrained case. This term reects the impact of the wealth constraint. In states of nature in
which the constraint is lax, we have d = 0 and the consumption growth rate has the standard
local behavior (in particular, the expected growth rate is absolutely continuous with respect to
Lebesgue measure). But consumption does not grow at the same rate as in the unconstrained case
since the consumption level anticipates future constrained states. Prior to reaching a constrained
state the agent builds up his wealth by reducing consumption. Furthermore in those good states
of nature in which the individual would like to deplete his wealth in order to improve his resources
at other less favorable times, he can only do so to a limited extent since he cannot take aggregate
short positions. Thus, each time the constraint binds, the agent has to readjust his consumption
behavior upwards given his inability to cross-subsidize less favorable states. These intuitions will
become clear below when we solve the consumption-portfolio problem in the tree example set up
in the introduction. However, before proceeding to this example we rst study the solution of the
control problem in detail: this will enable us to develop an algorithm to compute the multiplier
 and the optimal consumption-portfolio policy.
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3.4 The shadow price of liquidity.
In order to compute the consumption policy and shed further light on consumption behavior
we need to compute the multiplier . In this section, we provide a characterization of  which
facilitates its computation. The key to this characterization is the transformation of the forward-
backward structure of the original problem (20) into a purely backward structure. This is achieved
by a change of variables.
To solve the control problem of a constrained investor we must identify a process  and a
constant y such that
8
>
<
>
:

t
X
t
= E

R
T
t

s
[I((y , 
s
)
s
), e
s
]ds j F
t

 0; t 2 [0; T ]
X
t
d
t
= 0 for all t 2 [0; T ]; and  nondecreasing null at 0
E
R
T
0

s
[I((y , 
s
)
s
), e
s
]ds = nS
0
:
For any adapted process  dene the map
F
t
(y;
t
)  E

Z
T
t

s
[I((y ,

t;s
)
s
), e
s
]ds j F
t

 0 (21)


t;s
 sup
v2[t;s]

v
: (22)
for t 2 [0; T ]. Consider the auxiliary problem: nd an adapted process  and a constant y such
that
F
t
(y;
t
)  0; 8t 2 [0; T ] (23)
F
t
d
t
 0 for all t 2 [0; T ]; and  nonnegative null at T
+
(24)
E
Z
T
0

s
[I((y ,

0;s
)
s
), e
s
]ds = nS
0
(25)
Note that the rst two conditions (23)-(24) in the auxiliary problem have a backward structure
as opposed to the forward-backward structure of the original constrained problem. A closer look
at the two problems also reveals that the process  in the constrained problem is given by

t
= 

0;t
where  solves the backward problem. The auxiliary problem (23)-(25) then computes the \push"
at date t assuming that the constraint did not bind prior to t. This formulation is of interest
because it provides a useful and simple characterization of the Lagrange multiplier process.
Lemma 5 Consider the backward problem (23)-(25). A solution is given by

t
(y

) = F
 1
t
(y

; 0)1
fF
t
(y

;0)<0g
(26)
where F
 1
t
(y; 0) is the inverse of the map F
t
(y; ); dened in (21), and the constant y

uniquely
solves
E
Z
T
0

s
[I((y ,

0;s
(y))
s
), e
s
]ds = nS
0
: (27)
subject to 
0
= 0:
The solution of the consumption problem of a liquidity-constrained agent now follows.
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Theorem 6 Dene 
v
(y) and y

as in (26)-(27) and consider the process 

t
= 

0;t
(y

) 
sup
v2[0;t]

v
(y

): The optimal consumption policy of the constrained agent is given by
c
t
= I((y

, 

t
)
t
): (28)
and his optimal liquid wealth is X
t
= (
t
)
 1
E

R
T
t

s
[I((y

, 

s
)
s
), e
s
]ds j F
t

:
The characterization of the multiplier in Theorem 6 is relatively easy to implement numerically.
The main idea underlying the result is to start the problem anew at each point in time (i.e. ignoring
past occurrences of a binding constraint): this reduces the forward-backward equations satised
by the multiplier  in the rst-order conditions to a purely backward equation.
Given the optimal consumption policy in Theorem 6 and the results in Proposition 3 we obtain
the following characterization of the optimal portfolio.
Lemma 7 The optimal portfolio policy is 
t
= X
t
(
0
t
)
 1

t
+ 
 1
t
(
0
t
)
 1

t
where  is the unique,
progressively measurable process in the representation of the martingale
M
t
 E

Z
T
0

s
(I((y

, 

s
)
s
), e
s
)ds j F
t

,E

Z
T
0

s
(I((y

, 

s
)
s
), e
s
)ds

:
On the event fX
t
= 0g there is no investment in the stock: 
t
= 0.
At times when the constraint binds liquid wealth must be locally nondecreasing in order to
keep meeting the constraint. This can only be achieved if investment in the stock market is null:
on the event fX
t
= 0g the optimal portfolio is 
t
= 0.
To shed further light on the nature of the solution to the constrained problem we next use the
optimality conditions derived above to solve the example put forth in the introduction.
3.5 An example with liquidity constraints.
We now reconsider the example of Section 1.1, in the presence of a liquidity constraint. In order to
solve the consumption-portfolio problem, we use the algorithm based on the backward procedure
developed in section 3.4. Whenever the liquidity constraint binds the algorithm recomputes the
multiplier at all successor nodes to ensure nonnegative liquid wealth. The next tree shows the
evolution of the multiplier (), optimal consumption (c), end-of-period portfolio holdings (; B),
and beginning of period liquid wealth (X). The Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint in
the presence of liquidity constraints is 1:0932.
 = 0
c = 0:9707
X = 0
 = ,:21583
B = :25764
%
&

u
= 0:6959
c
u
= 1:5033
X
u
= 0

u
= ,:4004
B
u
= :6006
%
&

d
= 0
c
d
= 0:8783
X
u
= 0:0627

d
= ,:7068
B
d
= :7068
%
&

uu
= 0:9833
c
uu
= 2:5495
X
uu
= 0

ud
= 0:6959
c
ud
= 1:3602
X
ud
= 0:2002

du
= 0:4526
c
du
= 1:16
X
du
= 0

dd
= 0
c
dd
= 0:7947
X
dd
= 0:0728
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Consider nodes (u), (uu) and compare them with their equivalents in the unconstrained tree
in Section 1.1. At these nodes, the agent experiences good news regarding the realization of his
labor income relative to the
previous period. The unconstrained portfolio value is then negative because the agent tailors
his portfolio so as to transfer funds out of these nodes towards southern nodes of the tree with
relatively less favorable income realizations.
However, the constrained portfolio value is zero at these nodes: the agent cannot transfer as
much wealth from his high income realizations in nodes (u; uu) to the rest of the tree as he would
like, i.e. he cannot borrow against his future labor income. A consequence is that consumption
in the states (u, uu) has to increase relative to the unconstrained case, in which the individual
can hedge without restrictions. We thus have (c
u
; c
uu
) = (1:5033; 2:5495) in the constrained case
versus (c
u
; c
uu
) = (1:3264; 1:4659) in the unconstrained case of Section 1.1.
Note that this extra consumption \gulp" (relative to the unconstrained case) is due to the
inability to hold an aggregate short position at u. This is a source of path dependency in optimal
behavior (note that the tree above is not recombining while the tree in the unconstrained case
is recombining). The occurrence of a binding constraint at any of these nodes will permanently
decrease the marginal valuation of wealth at follower nodes, in the sense that the individual will
attempt to consume this extra consumption \gulp" by smoothing it across follower nodes.
For example, consider node (ud) in which unconstrained and constrained wealth are positive
(i.e. X
ud
= 0:0402 and X
ud
= 0:2002, respectively). In the constrained case, the agent reaches
that node after experiencing a binding constraint at the prior node (u), and even though he
faces exactly the same endowment and security returns that result in positive wealth in the
unconstrained case, he ends up consuming more: compare c
ud
= 1:3602 versus c
ud
= 1:2002 in
the unconstrained case. The increase in the Lagrange multiplier process  along the tree captures
this random but permanent decreases in the marginal utility of income.
Of course, the inability to transfer wealth out of states (u) and (uu) by constructing a portfolio
with a negative payo in those states implies that the investor is unable to compensate for his
low endowment in states (d; du; dd). Consumption at these nodes is therefore lower than in the
unconstrained case. Furthermore, as noted above, path dependency arises in the consumption
decision. For example, note that the portfolio value at (du) is zero. Since the investor is unable to
transfer wealth out of (u; ud), he tries to transfer wealth out of the next best node, which is (du),
towards (d; dd). To achieve this, the best he can do is to drive his wealth down to zero at the
beginning of period three at node (du), and consume his full endowment c
du
= e
du
= e
ud
= 1:16
there. Thus, due to the path dependency, the constraint binds at (du) even though wealth was
strictly positive there in the unconstrained case. Finally, at time zero he consumes an amount
which leaves him with zero nancial needs for future net consumption. This will be reected in
a larger multiplier value for the static budget constraint (3), namely 1:0932 versus 0:6545. This
implies that even though the constraint never binds, the consumption and portfolio behavior in the
constrained and unconstrained case will be dierent (for example, compare the paths ! d! dd
in the constrained and unconstrained cases).
In summary, liquidity constraints segment the uncertainty tree into subtrees. The nodes at
which the constraint binds and their successors are treated in isolation of the rest of the tree for
consumption smoothing purposes. Transfers of wealth then take place among the remaining nodes
of the tree, which form an independent system. In the example above, the nodes (u; uu; ud) form
a closed subtree: wealth cannot be shifted from these good states toward bad states of nature. As
a result, the wealth levels in the remaining nodes of the tree are lower in the constrained case than
in the unconstrained case. This explains why the relative prices of consumption in dierent states
will not be ex-ante equal to the marginal rate of substitution of consumption in these states. This
provides a rationale to a potentially counterintuitive result: at times at which the liquid wealth
of the consumer hits zero, he actually boosts his consumption level in a permanent fashion. Of
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course, this is compensated by smaller consumption levels in early age, almost everywhere relative
to the unconstrained case. Note also that the constraint has a substantial impact on the individual:
the ex-ante utility is ,1:1722 in the constrained case versus ,0:9981 in the unconstrained case.
Thus, as can be veried, the individual would be willing to give up around 26% of his endowment
at date 0 in order to avoid the constraint.
3.6 The consumption function for CRRA.
Under the assumption of power utility function the consumption function is
c
t
=
X
t
+E
t
[
R
T
t

t;s
e
s
ds]
E
t
[
R
T
t

1 1=R
t;s

y 
s
y 
t

 1=R
ds]
The following properties hold.
Proposition 8 Suppose that the individual has constant relative risk aversion.
(i) Consider an economy in which unconstrained consumption is an increasing function of rela-
tive risk aversion. In this context constrained consumption may be humped (increasing-decreasing).
(ii) The constrained consumption function is homogeneous of degree one in initial endowment
and wealth: c(kX
t
; ke
t
; t) = kc(X
t
; e
t
; t):
Unconstrained consumption is increasing in relative risk aversion if the interest rate is suf-
ciently large relative to the market price of risk. For the model with constant coecients a
necessary and sucient condition is r > (
1
2
, 1=R)
2
. In the presence of a liquidity constraint
consumption increases for low levels of risk aversion. Liquid wealth at future nodes is reduced
and this eventually leads to a binding constraint. When the constraint binds at nodes that were
previously unconstrained the subtrees issued from these nodes become segmented. Consumption
smoothing then takes place over the remainder of the tree. The net result is that consumption
eventually falls in order to allow reallocations over less favorable nodes of the remainder of the
tree. Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon.
The homogeneity property relative to total wealth follows from the homogeneity of the La-
grange multipliers with respect to multiplicative changes in endowments and liquid wealth. This
result extends the standard property for the unconstrained policy.
4 Equilibrium.
In this section we show the existence of a competitive equilibrium (section 4.1), provide a charac-
terization in terms of an "aggregator" (section 4.2), examine the equilibrium interest rate and the
equity premium (section 4.3) and provide numerical estimates for power utility function (section
4.4).
4.1 Existence of equilibrium.
Consider the economy of section 2 with one unconstrained and one constrained agents (agents 1
and 2, respectively). Let C = D + e denote aggregate consumption. We suppose that aggregate
endowment e = e
1
+ e
2
follows the Ito process
de
t
= e
t
[
e
t
ds+ 
e
t
dW
t
]
where (
e
; 
e
) are progressively measurable process. The aggregate consumption process C =
D + e has drift 
c
and volatility coecient 
c
given by
14
Figure 1: Parameter values: r = :1;  = :3;  = :2; 
e
= :1; 
e
= :2; e
0
= 10; S
0
= 100. Risk
aversion between .02 and 3.
C
c
= D
D
+ e
e
and C
c
= D
D
+ e
e
:
To prove existence of equilibrium we need to solve the equations that describe market clearing
and individual rationality, namely:
C
t
= I
1
(y
1

t
) + I
2
((y
2
, 
t
)
t
) (29)

t
X
2
t
= E

Z
T
t

s
[I
2
((y
2
, 
s
)
s
), e
2
s
]ds j F
t

 0; t 2 [0; T ] (30)
X
2
t
d
t
= 0;  nondecreasing null at 0 (31)
E
Z
T
0

s
[I
1
(y
1

s
), e
1
s
]ds = n
1
S
0
; y
1
 0 (32)
E
Z
T
0

s
[I
2
((y
2
, 
s
)
s
), e
2
s
]ds = n
2
S
0
; y
2
 0: (33)
By Walras law one of the budget constraints (32)-(33) is redundant. We can then set y
1
= 1,
dene y  y
2
and solve the remaining system for (y; ; ): Solving the market clearing condition
(29) yields the state price density (SPD)

t
= g(C
t
; y , 
t
)  g
t
(y , 
t
) (34)
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where g() is the inverse aggregate demand function with respect to the SPD, i.e. g() is the
unique solution of C
t
= I
1
(g(C
t
; y , 
t
)) + I
2
((y , 
t
)g(C
t
; y , 
t
)). Note that g() depends on
the net shadow price of the constraints x = y , . Dene the process h
t
(x) which represents the
value of net consumption at date t conditional on the net shadow price as
h
t
(x) = g
t
(x)[I
2
(xg
t
(x)), e
2
t
]: (35)
Substituting (35) in (30),(31) and (33) leaves us with the system

t
X
2
t
= E

Z
T
t
h
s
(y , 
s
)ds j F
t

 0; t 2 [0; T ] (36)
X
2
t
d
t
= 0;  nondecreasing null at 0 (37)
E
Z
T
0
h
s
(y , 
s
)ds = n
2
S
0
; y  0: (38)
The system (36)-(38) is similar in structure to the system of equations characterizing the opti-
mal consumption policy in the static problem. As we show in the appendix, the same methodology
can then be applied to prove the existence of a solution. This yields the existence of the compet-
itive equilibrium and the following characterization.
Theorem 9 Consider the economy E of section 2. A competitive equilibrium ((c
i
; 
i
)
i2C[U
;
(S; ;A; ); r) exists.
Theorem 9 is proved as a particular case of the N -agent equilibrium in Appendix C. Note that
our construction provides the equilibrium state price density in terms of the inverse aggregate
demand function and the shadow prices of the budget and liquidity constraints. In the next
section, we show that equilibrium prices in our economy are fully characterized by the SPD

t
= g(C
t
; y , 
t
) where g() is the inverse aggregate demand function dened above and the
multipliers (y; ) uniquely solve (36)-(38). This might come as a surprise, since aggregation
results are only known to hold in complete markets economies or economies with incomplete
markets but restricted diversity among agents. We therefore elaborate on this point in the next
section. In further sections, we will detail the structure of other equilibrium quantities and prices
that can be inferred from this SPD.
4.2 A representative agent characterization of equilibrium.
In economies with complete markets and diverse agents the second welfare theorem establishes the
existence of a no-trade equilibrium with identical pricing kernel. One can use this construction
to prove existence of equilibrium (Neigishi (1960)) or to characterize asset prices without demand
aggregation (Constantinides (1982)). Here we use the construction to characterize asset prices. In
independent work, Cuoco and He (1994) also applied a similar representative agent methodology
in an incomplete market model situation (though their source of incompleteness is dierent from
ours).
A feasible allocation is a non-negative array of processes (x
i
) such that
P
i
x
i
t
=
P
i
c
i
t
. For
simplicity here, take initial wealth to be zero.
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Proposition 10 Suppose that ((c
i
; 
i
)
i2C[U
; (S; ;A; ); r) is an equilibrium for the economy E.
Then the competitive allocation (c
i
) solves the problem
U (C)  sup
fx
i
g
E
 
Z
T
0
X
i2C[U

i
t
u
i
(x
i
t
; t)dt
!
s:t: (39)
X
i2C[U
x
i
t
=
X
i2C[U
c
i
t
 C
t
a:s:
with 
i
t
 1=(y
i
,
i
t
) where y
i
; 
i
are the multipliers associated with the individual control problems,
for i 2 C [ U (we maintain the convention 
i
t
= 0 for i 2 U). Moreover, (c; ) = (C; 1) is a
no-trade equilibrium for a single agent economy where the agent has the preferences U in (39).
One can prove that the maximum of (39) is achieved at
c
i
t
= I
i

H(C
t
; t; y; 
t
)

i
t

(40)
where H(x; t; y; 
t
) is the inverse of the continuous and decreasing function
P
i
I
i
(x=
i
t
) for x > 0.
Substituting back in (39) yields
U
0
(C
t
) = H(C
t
; t; y; 
t
) (41)
i.e., the pricing kernel H, identied from (40), is the marginal utility of the representative agent
U
0
: In the next sections we will make extensive use of the fact that the market price of risk is
driven by the risk aversion of the representative agent. Dybvig (1983) proved the same result for
a complete markets economy:
Proposition 11 The relative risk aversion coecient of the representative agent with utility
function (39) is the weighted harmonic average of the relative risk aversion coecients of the
individuals in the economy where the weights are the respective consumption shares.
Note that the previous result implies that, in equilibrium, the price of risk (expected return
per unit of volatility) is bounded above and below by the largest and smallest coecient of
relative risk aversion of the individuals in the economy, respectively. If we understand that the
much discussed \equity premium puzzle" makes reference to an abnormally high expected stock
return per unit of risk (the Sharpe ratio) rather than the level of the expected return
5
, the above
aggregation result in Proposition 11 states that it is futile to attempt to explain the puzzle through
liquidity constraints or incomplete markets in general: it is impossible to generate an aggregate
risk aversion which is larger than the relative risk aversion of all individuals in the economy.
4.3 Interest rate and equity premium with liquidity constraints.
In order to describe the equilibrium interest rate and prices it is convenient to use the risk
aversion coecient (R
a
) and prudence coecient (P
a
) of the representative agent constructed in
the previous section. These are respectively given by
R
a
t
= C
t
"
X
i
I
i
((y
i
, 
i
t
)
t

t
)
R
i
((y
i
, 
i
t
)
t

t
)
#
 1
= C
t
"
X
i
c
i
t
R
i
t
#
 1
P
a
t
=
(R
a
t
)
2
C
t
X
i
P
i
((y
i
, 
i
t
)
t

t
)I
i
((y
i
, 
i
t
)
t

t
)
R
i
((y
i
, 
i
t
)
t

t
)
2
=
(R
a
t
)
2
C
t
X
i
P
i
t
c
i
t
(R
i
t
)
2
:
5
The rationale for dening the equity premium puzzle through the Sharpe ratio lies in the fact that, keeping
other quantities constant, the level of expected return of its stock is aected by the leverage assumed by the rm.
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where R
i
and P
i
represent the relative risk aversion and relative prudence coecients of agent i.
Our next result details the structure of the competitive equilibrium.
Theorem 12 Consider the economy E of section 2 with u
i
(c; t) = exp(,t)u
i
(c) and suppose
that Assumption 1 holds with 
t
= R
a
t

c
t
: The equilibrium interest rate and equity premium are
dR
t
= r
t
dt+ dA
t
(42)
r
t
=  +R
a
t

c
,
1
2
R
a
t
P
a
t
(
c
)
2
(43)
dA
t
= ,
R
a
t
R
2
t
c
2
t
C
t
d
t
y , 
t
(44)

t
, r
t
= R
a
t

t

c
t
: (45)
The stock price satises the present value formula
S
t
= E[
Z
T
t
g
v
g
t
D
v
dv j F
t
] (46)
where g
v
= g(D
v
; y , 
v
) and its volatility is the unique process  such that for all t 2 [0; T ]
E[
Z
T
0
g
v
D
v
dv j F
t
],E[
Z
T
0
g
v
D
v
dv] =
Z
t
0
g
v
S
v
(
v
,R
a
v

c
v
)dW
v
: (47)
In equilibrium the riskless cumulative rate has two components. The rst is a locally riskless
interest rate r which has the familiar structure (43). As usual r is positively related to the expected
consumption growth rate and negatively related to aggregate consumption risk if the aggregator
exhibits positive prudence. Unlike models with portfolio constraints or incomplete markets, the
cumulative interest rate also has a singular component A; described in (44). This component
is tied to the occurrence of a binding liquidity constraint. Whenever the constraint binds the
consumption demand (savings demand) of the agent experiences a permanent predictable increase
(decrease). The cumulative interest rate naturally reects the increased demand: its fall is just
enough to provide an adequate incentive to reduce consumption immediately. The extent of the
decrease in cumulative interest rate is related to the size of the net multiplier y , . If the net
multiplier is small, past consumption deferral has been substantial enough to ensure that the
liquidity constraint is satised. If the liquidity constraint binds, the marginal value of wealth
decreases and the additional consumption increase required to match this decrease becomes large
(since marginal utility is very low). The required decrease in the cumulative riskfree return
becomes comparatively large.
6
The analysis above, thus, shows that liquidity constraints tend to
reduce the cumulative riskless return relative to an unconstrained economy. The incorporation of
these constraints may then help to resolve the riskfree rate puzzle (Weil (1990)).
Since the interest rate reects all the deterministic components in the growth rate of the
marginal utility of the aggregator it is not surprising to realize that the risk premium of the
stock (45) does not depend directly on the liquidity constraint. Indeed this risk premium has the
usual structure: it satises the consumption CAPM. Indirect eects of the liquidity constraint,
however, aect the intertemporal properties of the equity premium because the risk aversion
parameter of the aggregator is a composite of the risk aversions of all agents in the economy
and therefore reects the distribution of consumption across agents. Whenever the constraint
binds the aggregator's weight reallocates consumption across agents and this generates singular
components in the evolution of the equity premium. Does this mean that liquidity constraints
6
Singular components in cumulative interest rates also arise when marginal utility of agents is bounded at zero
(see Karatzas et al (1991)).
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can be invoked to justify the empirical magnitude of the Sharpe ratio? The answer is negative.
Indeed, the Sharpe ratio has an empirical magnitude of about :37 (using Mehra and Prescott's
(1985) numbers) Since consumption growth's volatility is :0357 this implies an aggregator's risk
aversion of 10:4 (see (45)). However, this number is unrealistic since the aggregator's risk aversion
is bounded above by the highest risk aversion of the agents populating the economy.
4.4 Examples
In this section we provide examples that can be solved in closed form and which illustrate the
eects of liquidity constraints described above. In the rst example, agents have homogeneous
constant relative risk aversion parameter: the cumulative interest decreases while the Sharpe ratio
is unaected. In the second example, relative risk aversions depend on the consumption levels
and distributional eects aect equilibrium prices.
4.4.1 Example 1.
Consider a simple economy with 2 agents with homogeneous and constant relative risk aversion
R. The aggregator's risk aversion and prudence coecients are R
a
t
= R and P
a
t
= 1 + R: The
equilibrium Sharpe ratio which equals

t
, r
t

t
= R
c
t
is unaected by the liquidity constraint. The cumulative interest is given by
dR
t
= r
t
dt+ dA
t
r
t
=  +R
c
t
,
1
2
R(1 +R)(
c
t
)
2
dA
t
= ,
c
2
t
C
t
d
t
y , 
t
:
Hence, the interest rate r is the same while the cumulative interest R decreases relative to an
economy without the liquidity constraint but identical in all other respects.
4.4.2 Example 2.
Consider now an economy with 2 agents with relative risk aversion coecients R
1
t
= R
1
(c
1
t
) and
R
2
t
= R
2
(c
2
t
). The aggregator's risk aversion coecient is
R
a
t
= C
t

c
1
t
R
1
t
+
c
2
t
R
2
t

 1
:
Using c
1
t
+ c
2
t
= C
t
we get
@R
a
t
@c
2
t
< 0 i
R
1
t
,R
2
t
R
1
t
R
2
t
,

c
2
t
(R
2
t
)
2
@R
2
t
@c
2
t
,
c
1
t
(R
1
t
)
2
@R
1
t
@c
1
t

> 0: (48)
Under this condition the aggregator's risk aversion increases in the early stages of the liquidity
constrained economy relative to an unconstrained economy. The equilibrium Sharpe ratio will
be larger as well. Sucient conditions for (48) to hold are decreasing relative risk aversion of
constrained agents, combined with increasing relative risk aversion of unconstrained agents and
R
1
 R
2
at the unconstrained allocation.
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5 Liquidity constraints and incomplete markets.
In this section we outline an extension of our results to incomplete markets. In this environment
liquidity constraints combine with the failure of full insurance to determine equilibrium prices
and the consumption allocation.
We suppose that the uncertainty is represented by the 2-dimensional Wiener process W =
(W
1
;W
2
) dened on (
;F). The ltration F
()
is the natural ltration generated by W . The
dividend process of the stock and the aggregate endowment processes are
dD
t
= D
t
[
D
t
dt+ 
D
t
dW
1t
]; D
0
given. (49)
de
t
= e
t
[
e
t
dt+ 
e
1t
dW
1t
+ 
e
2t
dW
2t
]; e
0
given. (50)
where (
D
; 
e
t
; 
D
; 
e
1
; 
e
2
) are progressively measurable processes, i.e. they may depend on both
Brownian motions W
1
and W
2
. Aggregate consumption C = D + e evolves according to
dC
t
= C
t
[
c
t
dt+ 
c
1t
dW
1t
+ 
c
2t
dW
2t
]; C
0
given. (51)
Let 
c
t
=
 
(
c
1t
)
2
+ (
c
2t
)
2

1
2
and dene the new processes
7
(
dW
1t
=
1

c
t


c
1t
dW
1t
+ 
c
2t
dW
2t

dW
2t
=
1

c
t


c
2t
dW
1t
, 
c
1t
dW
2t

:
In this new system of coordinates aggregate consumption and aggregate endowment become
dC
t
= C
t
[
c
t
dt+ 
c
t
dW
1t
] (52)
de
t
= e
t
[
e
t
dt+
1

c
t
[(
e
1t

c
1t
+ 
e
2t

c
2t
)dW
1t
+ (
e
1t

c
2t
, 
e
2t

c
1t
)dW
2t
] : (53)
The stock price satises
dS
t
+D
t
dt = S
t
[dm
t
+ 
1t
dW
1t
+ 
2t
dW
2t
] (54)
subject to some initial value S
0
, wherem and  are progressively measurable and dm
t
= 
t
dt+dA
t
.
The riskless return is dR
t
= r
t
dt + dA
t
. The remaining structure of the economy as well as the
denitions of individual rationality and equilibrium are the same as in section 2.
In this economy there are 2 sources of uncertainty but only one risky stock. Note that (53)
allows for the possibility that the individual idiosyncratic income is not spanned by traded assets.
Thus the market is incomplete even in the absence of any liquidity constraints. The initial value
of the stock S
0
, the coecients (m;;A; 
1
; 
2
), and the values of R and r are endogenous.
Note, in particular, that individual rationality combined with market clearing will determine the
7
This denition implies F
W
()
 F
W
()
(the ltration generated by W is contained in the one generated by W ). It is
also straightforward to verify that W
1
and W
2
are independent Brownian motion processes. Furthermore provided

c
t
> 0 for all t 2 [0; T ] we can invert this relation and write the following stochastic dierential equations for W;
(
dW
1t
=
1

c
t
[
c
1t
dW
1t
+ 
c
2t
dW
2t
]
dW
2t
=
1

c
t
[
c
2t
dW
1t
  
c
1t
dW
2t
]
:
If the coecients (

c
1t

c
t
;

c
2t

c
t
) satisfy standard Lipschitz and Growth conditions this SDE has a unique strong solution.
This implies F
W
()
 F
W
()
. Combining these two inclusions gives F
W
()
= F
W
()
. Hence there is no loss of generality if
we take W as our primitive.
20
volatility structure (
1
; 
2
) of the stock price: the class of price processes (54) is suciently large
to accommodate an instantaneous impact of both Brownian motion processes on the stock price.
Since markets are incomplete agents have individual valuations of the risks aecting the econ-
omy. Assuming that 
1
6= 0 we can dene the individual prices of risk from i's point of view

i
=


i
1

i
2

=


1

2
0 1

 1

, r

i
, r

where 
i
represents the shadow price of the incomplete market constraint, i.e. it represents the
drift of a ctitious individualized security with return df
t
= f
t
[
i
t
dt + dW
2t
]. The incomplete
market restriction can be viewed as a portfolio constraint which precludes any investment in
this ctitious security. Hence if (
i
; 
i
f
) denotes the demand for investment in the stock and
the ctitious asset respectively, the incomplete markets constraint can be summarized by the
condition 
i
f
= 0. In this setting the counterpart of Assumption 1 is
Assumption 1': The individual prices of risk 
i
satisfy E exp

1
2
R
T
0



i
t


2
dt

<1; i = 1; 2.
The dynamic problem of a liquidity constrained individual is
sup
(c;)
U(c) s:t: (c; ) 2 A (55)
The corresponding static problem becomes
sup
c
U(c) s:t (56)
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
c  0, progressively measurable and integrable

i
t
X
t
= E

R
T
t

i
s
(c
s
, e
s
)ds j F
t

 0 t 2 [0; T ]
E

R
T
0

i
t
(c
t
, e
t
)dt

= nS
0
;
 such that X 2 Sp[S]
(57)
where 
i
is the state price density based on the market price of risk 
i
and where Sp[S] denotes
the span generated by the process S, i.e. the span of
R
t
0
(
1t
dW
1t
+ 
2t
dW
2t
). The following
proposition establishes the relationship between problems (55) and (56)-(57).
Proposition 13 Assume that assumption 1' holds and that u satises the conditions of assump-
tion 2. If (c; ) solves the dynamic problem (55), then there exists  such that c solves the static
problem (56)-(57). Conversely, if (c; ) solves the static problem (56)-(57), then there exists a
portfolio policy  such that (c; ) solves the dynamic problem (55).
The static problem gives rise to the following Kuhn-Tucker rst order conditions
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
u
c
(c
t
; t) = (y , 
t
)
i
t
E

Z
T
0

i
t
(c
t
, e
t
)dt

= nS
0
E

Z
T
t

i
s
(c
s
, e
s
)ds j F
t

 0
E

Z
T
0
X
t
d
t

= 0
c
t
 0; y  0
  0;nondecreasing, null at 0
 such that X 2 Sp[S]:
(58)
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The only dierence with the earlier formulation is the addition of the incompleteness constraint
(last equation) to the set of relevant conditions.
Our next verication theorem shows that the conditions (58) are sucient for the static
optimization problem.
Theorem 14 Assume that assumptions 1' and 2 hold. Suppose that there exist progressively
measurable processes (c; ; ) and a constant y such that (c; ; ; y) solves (58). Then c solves
(56) subject to (57).
In order to characterize the competitive equilibrium we need to solve the equations that
describe market clearing and individual rationality, namely:
C
t
= I
1
(y
1

1
t
) + I
2
((y
2
, 
t
)
2
t
) (59)

t
X
2
t
= E

Z
T
t

2
s
[I
2
((y
2
, 
s
)
2
s
), e
2
s
]ds j F
t

 0; t 2 [0; T ] (60)
X
2
t
d
t
= 0;  nondecreasing null at 0 (61)
E
Z
T
0

1
s
[I
1
(y
1

1
s
), e
1
s
]ds = n
1
S
0
; y
1
> 0 (62)
E
Z
T
0

2
s
[I
2
((y
2
, 
s
)
2
s
), e
2
s
]ds = n
2
S
0
; y
2
> 0: (63)

i
s.t. X
i
2 Sp[S] (64)
By Walras law one of the budget constraints (62)-(63) is redundant. We can then set y
1
= 1,
dene y  y
2
and  = 
2
=
1
and solve the remaining system for (y; ; 
1
; ): Solving the market
clearing condition (59) yields the SPD

1
t
= g(C
t
; y , 
t
; 
t
)  g
t
(y , 
t
; 
t
) (65)
where g() is the unique solution of C
t
= I
1
(g(C
t
; y,
t
; 
t
))+I
2
((y,
t
)g(C
t
; y,
t
; 
t
)
t
): Dene
the process h
t
(x; 
t
) which represents the value of net consumption at date t conditional on the
net shadow price of the constraint x = y , 
t
as
h
t
(x; 
t
) = g
t
(x; 
t
)[I
2
(xg
t
(x; 
t
)
t
), e
2
t
]: (66)
Substituting (65) in (60),(61) and (63) leaves us with the system

t
X
2
t
= E

Z
T
t
h
s
(y , 
s
; 
s
)ds j F
t

 0; t 2 [0; T ] (67)
X
2
t
d
t
= 0;  nondecreasing null at 0 (68)
E
Z
T
0
h
s
(y , 
s
; 
s
)ds = n
2
S
0
; y  0: (69)

i
s.t.X
i
2 Sp[S] for i = 1; 2: (70)
This system of equations is in part similar to the system of equations characterizing the com-
plete markets' equilibrium. The impact of incompleteness is embedded in the last two constraints
which require that the liquid wealth processes of agents lie in the asset span. For the multiagent
economy with incomplete market and liquidity constraint equilibrium has the following structure.
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Theorem 15 Consider the multiagent economy of section 2 with general utility function u
i
(c); i =
1:2 satisfying assumption 2. Assume that an equilibrium exists such that assumption 1' holds for
i = 1; 2. The equilibrium interest rate and asset risk premia satisfy
r
t
= R
a
t

c
,
1
2
R
a
t
P
a
t
(
c
t
)
2
,
1
2
R
a
t

2
1t
+ 
2
2t

2
1t
X
i

c
i
t
P
i
t
C
t
(R
i
t
)
2
(
i
2t
)
2

+R
a
t

2t

c
t

1t
X
i

c
i
t
P
i
t
C
t
(R
i
t
)
2

i
2t

dA
t
= ,
R
a
t
R
2
t
c
2
t
C
t
1
y , 
t
d
t

t
, r
t
= R
a
t

c
t

1t
(71)
where
R
a
t
=
"
X
i
c
i
t
C
t
1
R
i
t
#
 1
and P
a
t
= (R
a
t
)
2
X
i
c
i
t
P
i
t
C
t
(R
i
t
)
2
:
The structure of equilibrium reects the dierent frictions in the economy. The interest rate
is directly aected by the liquidity constraint as in the earlier model with complete market. In
addition incompleteness plays a role: the level of the interest rate and the response to shifts in
aggregate consumption growth rate and volatility depend on the individual prices of W
2
-risk.
The risk premium of the stock displays structural properties which are similar to the case
of complete markets since it satises the consumption CAPM: in view of (71), only covariance
with aggregate consumption commands a premium. The liquidity constraint again has an indirect
eect on the size of the premium through the risk aversion of the aggregator and the distribution
of consumption in the economy. Note that incompleteness has no eect on the structure of the
consumption CAPM since the distribution of marginal utilities across agents, which represents
the second factor in this economy, is orthogonal to the stock's returns.
Note also that incompleteness cannot rationalize the empirical size of the Sharpe ratio either:
the aggregator's risk aversion is the same harmonic average of the agents risk aversions as in the
case of liquidity constraints alone. Since W
1
and W
2
risks are uncorrelated, it is easy to see from
(71) that the Sharpe ratio of the market is bounded above by R
a
t

c
t
, which is the Sharpe ratio
corresponding to the same economy but with complete markets. This indicates that an aggregate
risk aversion of 10:4 can not be plausibly supported in this model.
Our last result specializes the model to homogeneous constant relative risk aversion.
Corollary 16 Consider the multiagent economy of this section with homogeneous constant rela-
tive risk aversion u
i
(c) =
1
1 R
c
1 R
; i = 1; 2 for i = 1; 2. Assume that an equilibrium exists such
that Assumption 1' holds. The equilibrium interest rate and the equity premium satisfy
r
t
= R
c
,
1
2
R(1 +R)(
c
t
)
2
,
1
2
1 +R
R

2
1t
+ 
2
2t

2
1t
X
i

c
i
t
C
t
(
i
2t
)
2

dA
t
= ,
c
2
t
C
t
d
t
y , 
t

t
, r
t
= R
c
t

1t
:
Both the incomplete market restriction and the liquidity constraint reduce the interest rate relative
to the complete market case.
Two additional features of the competitive equilibrium are noteworthy in the case under
consideration. First note that both the incomplete market and the liquidity constraint tend to
reduce the interest rate relative to the frictionless case. Incompleteness has a negative impact
since marginal utilities and the distribution of consumption across agents become unambiguously
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more volatile when relative risk aversion is constant and homogeneous. This reinforces the case
for an explanation of the riskfree puzzle based on incomplete markets and liquidity constraints.
The second feature of equilibrium is the fact that the Sharpe ratio does not increase because
of market incompleteness or liquidity constraints. Since the CCAPM holds and due to the orthog-
onality between dW
1
and dW
2
risks in (54), it is easy to see from the third equation in Corollary
16 that when markets are incomplete, the Sharpe ratio is bounded above by the Sharpe ratio that
would otherwise hold if markets were complete and the agent faced no liquidity constraint.
In summary, our results indicate there is no hope for explanations of the equity premium
puzzle based on incomplete markets or liquidity constraints as dened in this paper. This poses
a problem for the literature that seeks to resolve this puzzle on the basis of ad-hoc portfolio
constraints. Our point is that once these portfolio constraints are endogenized and made eectively
wealth-dependent, the asset-pricing implications regarding risk premia change radically.
6 Conclusions.
In this paper we presented a general equilibrium analysis of an exchange economy in which some
agents cannot market their income. We have shown that a liquidity constraint restricts the con-
sumption allocation of an individual over the lifecycle. Constrained individuals will optimally
defer consumption to the future in order to insure against liquidity shortages. At times when the
constraint binds their consumption experiences permanent increases. The individual consump-
tion behavior aects the structure of prices and the interest rate at equilibrium. Our analysis
demonstrates that short term rates have a tendency to decrease in the presence of a liquidity
constraint. Liquidity constraints may then help to resolve the riskfree rate puzzle. However, the
valuation of risk does not seem to change much since the equilibrium price of risk is a positive
and convex combination of the relative risk aversion coecients of the agents in the economy. In
any case neither market incompleteness nor liquidity constraints can be invoked to explain the
empirical magnitude of the Sharpe ratio. In further work we will seek to investigate analytically
and numerically the impact of liquidity constraints on the volatility of asset prices and on the
average level of the equity premium.
The paper also includes several methodological contributions. The rst of these is a new
approach to the consumption problem in the presence of a liquidity constraint which leads to
an explicit solution for the consumption policy and which lends itself to numerical implementa-
tion. The second contribution is a constructive approach to the determination of equilibrium in
economies with liquidity constraints. The third methodological contribution is the design of a
computational algorithm which enables us to handle the type of path-dependent problems that
arise in the presence of liquidity constraints. The fourth methodological contribution consists
of a local aggregation method, essentially dierent from Rubinstein (1974), that enables us to
characterize the pricing kernel as the marginal utility of a representative agent in an incomplete
markets economy. We foresee several other areas of applications of these methods, including
macroeconomic and international asset pricing models involving barriers and constraints, and
models incorporating default risk.
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7 Appendices.
7.1 Appendix A: proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1: Using Ito^'s lemma, we can express (10) as

t
X
i
t
= X
i
0
+
Z
t
0

s
(e
i
s
, c
i
s
)ds+
Z
t
0

s
(
i
s

s
,X
i
s

s
)dW
s
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which implies that the processes
Y
i
t
 
t
X
i
t
+
Z
t
0

s
(c
i
s
, e
i
s
)ds and Z
i
t
 Y
i
t
+E

Z
T
0

s
e
i
s
ds j F
t

are continuous local martingales. Now, since c
i
 0, if X
i
t
is generated by some
 
c
i
; 
i

2 A
i
; we
have Z
i
t

R
t
0

s
c
i
s
ds 8 i 2 C [ U; which implies that Z
i
t
is bounded below and it is therefore a
supermartingale, by Fatou's lemma. Substituting the denition of Z
i
into the inequality E(Z
i
T
j
F
t
)  Z
i
t
and rearranging, we then see that

t
X
i
t
 E


T
X
i
T
+
Z
T
t

s
(c
i
s
, e
i
s
)ds j F
t

(72)
8 i 2 C [ U , which proves the claim.
Proof of Lemma 2: It is clear that nonsatiability implies X
i
T
= 0 a.s. Now, assume that the
inequality (72) is met strictly in some set with positive probability. Then there exists a positive
and adapted process "
t
such that E

R
T
t

s
 
c
i
s
+ "
s
, e
i
s

ds

= 
t
X
i
t
. Denote by X
i;"
t
the solution
of (11) just substituting the process c+ " for c. By lemma 1 we have X
i
t
 X
i;"
t
; and consequently
since X
i
t
satises (11) so does X
i;"
t
. This implies that (; c+ ") is admissible and furthermore
E

R
T
0
u(c
t
+ "
t
; t)dt

> E

R
T
0
u(c
t
; t)dt

, which contradicts the assumed optimality of c.
Proof of Proposition 3: The proof consists of showing that if a pair (
0
; c
0
) is admissible (i.e.
satises (11)), then c
0
satises (16) and conversely, for any consumption policy c
0
that satises
(16), there exists an adapted process  such that (; c) is admissible. This will prove the rst
claim. The direct implication is immediate in view of (11), (12), wealth and (16). For the reverse
implication, dene  as in (17). Certainly  thus dened is progressively measurable. Substituting
 into (10) and applying Ito^'s lemma to 
t
X
i
t
, integrating and taking expectations leads to

t
X
i
t
= X
i
0
+
Z
t
0

s
(e
i
s
, c
i
s
)ds+M
t
= E

Z
T
t

s
 
c
i
s
, e
i
s

ds j F
t

where in the rst equalityM
t
is the process dened in (18) and the second equality is obtained by
using the static budget constraintX
i
0
+E

R
T
0

s
(e
i
s
, c
i
s
)ds

= 0. SinceE

R
T
t

s
(c
i
s
, e
i
s
)ds j F
t


0 we conclude that X
i
t
 0 8i 2 C [ U . This establishes that (; c) is admissible.
Proof of Theorem 4: Let c
0
be an alternative feasible policy satisfying (16). Concavity of the
utility function implies u (c
t
; t)  u(c
0
t
; t) + u
c
(c
t
; t) (c
t
, c
0
t
) so that by (20), u (c
t
; t)  u(c
0
t
; t) +
(y , 
t
)
t
(c
t
, c
0
t
). Integrating and taking expectations gives
E

Z
T
0
u (c
t
; t)

 E

Z
T
0
u(c
0
t
; t)

+E

Z
T
0
(y , 
t
)
t
(c
t
, c
0
t
)dt

(73)
Dening g
t

R
t
0

s
(c
s
, c
0
s
)ds and integrating by parts we get
Z
T
0

t
dg
t
= ,
Z
T
0
g
t
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t
+ 
T
g
T
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Z
T
0
Z
t
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
s
(c
s
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0
s
)dsd
t
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T
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
t
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t
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0
t
)dt: (74)
Taking expectations on each side of (74) and using the denition of g
t
, we can write
E

Z
T
0

t

t
 
c
t
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0
t

dt

= E

Z
T
0

Z
T
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0
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Z
t
0
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0
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
d
t

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= E
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T
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Z
T
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s
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and substituting this into (73), we arrive at
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Now, by the second condition in (20) and the feasibility of c and c
0
we have E

R
T
0

t
(c
t
, c
0
t
)dt

 0. Also, the complementary slackness condition in (20) implies that E

R
T
0

t
X
t
d
t

= 0: But
since X
0
t
 0 (c
0
satises (16) by hypothesis), and also since 
t
is nondecreasing, we conclude that
U(c)  U(c
0
) for some c satisfying (20) and any c
0
satisfying (16).
Proof of Lemma 5: Consider the map F
t
(y; ) for y > 0 xed. Note that F
t
(y; ) : [0; y] !
[F
t
(y; 0);1) is continuous and strictly increasing. Thus a unique inverse exists and if 0 is in the
range of F
t
(y; ) the inverse F
 1
t
(y; 0) is well dened. It follows that

t
(y) = F
 1
t
(y; 0)1
fF
t
(y;0)<0g
is uniquely dened and satises (23)-(24) for all t 2 [0; T ]: Furthermore 
t
(y) is a continuous and
nondecreasing function of y. The map E
R
T
0

s
[I((y ,

0;s
(y))
s
), e
s
]ds is then continuous with
respect to y and tends to1 as y ! 0: Taking y

= inffy > 0 : E
R
T
0

s
[I((y,

0;s
(y))
s
),e
s
]ds =
nS
0
g ensures that the initial condition (27) is satised and 
0
= 0.
Proof of Proposition 8: (i) Consider the example of Figure 1. For the numerical values
selected the maximal value of the function (
1
2
,
1
R
)
2
when R 2 [:02; 3] is :015. Since r = :1 we
have r > (
1
2
,
1
R
)
2
. This ensures that unconstrained consumption is an increasing function of
relative risk aversion. The numerical simulation shows that constrained consumption is humped.
(ii) The optimal liquid wealth process associated with the initial conditions (kX
0
; ke
0
) is
X
k
t
= E

Z
T
t
[
1 1=R
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, 
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]ds j F
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:
It is easy to verify that X
k
t
= kX
t
; y
k
= k
 R
y and 
k
s
= k
 R

s
satises the required constraints.
Homogeneity of the consumption function follows.
Proof of Lemma 7: Dene the process N
t
= E

R
T
t

s
(c
s
, e
s
) ds j F
t

evaluated at optimal
consumption. Since optimal consumption satises N
t
 0 for all t 2 [0; T ] it must be the case that
dN
t
 0 on the event fN
t
= 0g. Thus d[N ]
t
= 0 on fN
t
= 0g where [N ] represents the quadratic
variation of N . Consider now the process M dened in Proposition 3. We have
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Integrating the quadratic variation over fN
t
= 0g and using d[N ]
t
= 0 over that event leads to
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But Proposition 3 implies d[M ]
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dt. Using X
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We conclude that 
t
= 0 on fN
t
= 0g:
Proof of Theorem 6: Recall the functions g
t
and h
t
such that
C
t
= I
1
(g
t
(x)) + I
2
(xg
t
(x)) (75)
h
t
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2
t
]: (76)
These functions have the following properties
Lemma 17 For all t 2 [0; T ] the function g
t
() : [0; y]! [g
t
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(i) g
t
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:
Proof of Lemma 17: The function g
t
() is continuously dierentiable on [0; y]: An application
of the Implicit Function Theorem yields (iv). Property (i) follows from (iv). When x ! 0 we
have I
2
(xg
t
(x)) ! 1 for all g
t
(x) nite. Since the left hand side of (75) is nite and I
1
() is
nonnegative the limit (ii) holds. Property (iii) is straightforward.
Lemma 18 For all t 2 [0; T ] the function h
t
() : [0; y]! [h
t
(y); 0] satis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(i) 9x

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Proof of Lemma 18: Properties (ii), (iii) and (iv) are straightforward. To prove (i) note that
(75) implies I
2
(xg
t
(x)) , e
2
t
 0 for x suciently low. Let x

be such that I
2
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
g
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(x

)) , e
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= 0
or if no such x
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exists in (0; y] set x
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= y. Property (iv) of Lemma 17 implies
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Hence I
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(x)) , e
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t
is strictly decreasing and for x < x

we have I
2
(xg
t
(x)) , e
2
t
> 0: Since
g
0
t
(x) < 0 it then follows from (iv) that h
0
t
(x) < 0 for x < x

.
Consider now the process
F
t
(y;
t
) = E

Z
T
t
h
s
(y ,

t;s
)ds j F
t

; t 2 [0; T ]: (77)
Solving
F
t
(y;
t
)  0; t 2 [0; T ] (78)
F
t
(y;
t
)d
t
 0; t 2 [0; T ] (79)
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is identical to the problem that we solved before. As long as the integrand h
t
(x) has the right
properties we can apply the construction in Lemma 5 and Theorem 6. Since the function h
t
(y ,


t;s
) is strictly increasing with respect to 
t
for 
t
suciently large, we can always nd 
t
(y)
such that F
t
(y;
t
(y))  0: Hence the same construction as in the case of exogenous state price
density works. The same arguments also lead to the multiplier y which satises the static budget
constraint (25) of the constrained agent in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 11: From (41) and the denition of H we get the expression
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for the inverse of the aggregator's relative risk aversion. Note that we used the rst order condi-
tions of the individual agents' problem to obtain the last equality.
Proof of Theorem 12: To simplify notation we assume that the unconstrained agent has a
liquidity constraint multiplier 
1
= 0. Both agents have utility function u(c; t) = 
 1
t
u(c) where

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= exp(t); let I(y) = u
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c
(y) denote the inverse of u
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denotes the quadratic variation process. Dividing by C
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:
and R
2
t
is the coecient of risk aversion of the constrained agent. By denition I
i
(y) satises
u
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(y)) = y. Substituting d
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The formulas in the Theorem follow from the de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Proof of Proposition 10: Construct the positive process 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(c
i
t
, x
i
t
)dt  0
where the rst inequality follows from concavity and the rst order conditions, the second in-
equality follows from the denition of the process 
i
t
and the feasibility of the allocations

c
i
t
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and

x
i
t
	
. This inequality shows that

c
i
t
	
solves (39). To prove that (fD
t
+ e
t
; 1g) is a no trade
equilibrium for the single agent economy, we just need to show that fC
t
g solves
sup
x
U (x) s:t: E

Z
T
0

t
(x
t
, C
t
) dt

 0:
Suppose that there exists a process x such that U (x) > U (C) and E

R
T
0

t
(x
t
, C
t
) dt

 0.
This implies that there exists a process

x
i
t
	
such that
P
i
x
i
t
= x
t
and, using
P
i
c
i
t
= C
t
, we have
E
X
i
Z
T
0
 

i
t
u
i
(x
i
t
; t), 
t
(x
i
t
, e
i
t
)

dt > E
X
i
Z
T
0
 

i
t
u
i
(c
i
t
; t), 
t
(c
i
t
, e
i
t
)

dt
but this contradicts the fact that
@u
i
(c
i
t
;t)
@c
i
t
=
1

i
t

t
:
Proof of Theorem 15: Suppose that a competitive equilibrium exists with 
1
6= 0. Recall that
individual SPDs are,

i
t
= b
t
exp

,
Z
t
0

i
1v
dW
1v
,
Z
t
0

i
2v
dW
2v
,
1
2
Z
t
0
[(
i
1v
)
2
+ (
i
2v
)
2
]dv

; (80)
for processes 
i
 (
i
1
; 
i
2
); i = 1; 2, dened as

i
t
=


i
1t

i
2t




1t

2t
0 1

 1


t
, r
t

i
t
, r
t

=
1

1t


t
, r
t
, 
2t

i
2t

1t
(
i
t
, r
t
)

:
Our rst lemma expresses the competitive equilibrium in terms of individual market prices of risk.
Lemma 19 In equilibrium the interest rate and the individual prices of risk satisfy
dR
t
=
 
,
1
A
t

c
+
1
2
X
i

B
i
t
A
t

[(
i
1t
)
2
+ (
i
2t
)
2
]
!
dt,
A
2
t
A
t
1
y , 
t
d
t
(81)
X
i
A
i
t

i
1t
= ,
c
t
(82)
X
i
A
i
t

i
2t
= 0 (83)
where
A
i
t
=
I
0
i
(y
i

i
t
)y
i

i
t
P
i
I
i
(y
i

i
t
)
and B
i
t
=
I
00
i
(y
i

i
t
)
(
y
i

i
t
)
2
P
i
I
i
(y
i

i
t
)
and A
t
= A
1
t
+A
2
t
where y
1
= 1 and y
2
= y , 
t
:
Proof of Lemma 19: Ito's lemma along with the goods market equilibrium condition C
t
=
I
1
(
1
t
) + I
2
(
1
t
(y, 
t
)
t
) gives (to simplify notation we omit the arguments of the functions I
i
())
C
t
[
c
dt+ 
c
t
dW
1t
] = ,I
0
1

1
t

dR
t
+ 
1
1t
dW
1t
+ 
1
2t
dW
2t

,I
0
2

1
t

t

(y , 
t
)

dR
t
+ 
2
1t
dW
1t
+ 
2
2t
dW
2t

+ d
t

+
1
2
h
I
00
1
 (
1
t
)
2



1
t


2
+ I
00
2
 ((y , 
t
)
2
t
)
2



2
t


2
i
dt
where



i
t


2
= (
i
1t
)
2
+ (
i
2t
)
2
; i = 1; 2: Collecting terms and setting the coecients of dW
1t
; dW
2t
and of the bounded variation terms equal to zero yields the formulas in the lemma.
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Lemma 20 In equilibrium the interest rate and the Sharpe ratio satisfy
dR
t
=
 
,
1
A
t

c
+
1
2

B
t
A
3
t

(
c
t
)
2
+
1
2

2
t

2
1t
X
i

B
i
t
A
t
(
i
2t
)
2

+
1
A
t

2t

c
t

1t
X
i

B
i
t
A
t

i
2t

!
dt,
A
2
t
A
t
d
t
y , 
t

t
, r
t

1t
= ,
1
A
t

c
t
where 
2
t
= 
2
1t
+ 
2
2t
and B
t
=
P
i
B
i
t
.
Proof of Lemma 20: Multiplying both sides of (82)-(83) by


1t

2t
0 1

leads to the formula for the Sharpe ratio. Using the denitions of the market prices of risk yields



i
t


2
=

1

1t
(
t
, r
t
, 
2t

i
2t
)

2
+ (
i
2t
)
2
=


t
, r
t

1t

2
+

2
1t
+ 
2
2t

2
1t
(
i
2t
)
2
, 2


t
, r
t

1t


2t

1t

i
2t
for i = 1; 2, where



i
t


2
= (
i
1t
)
2
+ (
i
2t
)
2
: Substituting in the interest formula (81) produces
dR
t
=
 
,
1
A
t

c
+
1
2

B
t
A
t


t
, r
t

1t

2
+
1
2

2
1t
+ 
2
2t

2
1t
X
i

B
i
t
A
t
(
i
2t
)
2

!
dt
,


t
, r
t

1t


2t

1t
X
i

B
i
t
A
t

i
2t

dt,
A
2
t
A
t
d
t
y , 
t
Substituting the Sharpe ratio formula in this expression produces the result in the lemma.
Dierentiating the rst order condition u
0
(I
i
(x
i
)) = x
i
, where x
i
= (y
i
, 
i
)
i
t
gives 1 =
u
00
(I
i
(x
i
))I
0
i
(x
i
) and 0 = u
000
(I
i
(x
i
))I
0
i
(x
i
)
2
+ u
00
(I
i
(x
i
))I
00
i
(x
i
) so that
I
0
i
(x
i
)x
i
=
u
0
(I
i
(x
i
))
u
00
(I
i
(x
i
))
= ,
c
i
t
R
i
t
and I
00
i
(x
i
)(x
i
)
2
= ,
u
000
(I
i
(x
i
))
u
00
(I
i
(x
i
))
u
0
(I
i
(x
i
))
2
u
00
(I
i
(x
i
))
2
=
c
i
t
P
i
t
(R
i
t
)
2
leading to A
i
t
= ,c
i
t
=(C
t
R
i
t
) and B
i
t
= c
i
t
P
i
t
=(C
t
(R
i
t
)
2
). Substitution in the expressions of the
lemma produces
dR
t
=
0
@
1
P
i
c
i
t
R
i
t
C
t

c
,
1
2
2
4
P
i
c
i
t
P
i
t
(R
i
t
)
2
(
P
i
c
i
t
R
i
t
)
3
3
5
(C
t

c
t
)
2
,
1
2
1
P
i
c
i
t
R
i
t

2
1t
+ 
2
2t

2
1t
X
i

c
i
t
P
i
t
(R
i
t
)
2
(
i
2t
)
2

1
A
dt
+
1
(
P
i
c
i
t
R
i
t
)
2
C
t

2t

c
t

1t
X
i

c
i
t
P
i
t
(R
i
t
)
2

i
2t

dt,
c
2
t
R
2
t
P
i
c
i
t
R
i
t
d
t
y , 
t
and (
t
, r
t
)=
1t
=

P
i
(c
i
t
=R
i
t
)

 1
C
t

c
t
: This completes the proof of Theorem 15.
Proof of Corollary16: Suppose that R
1
t
= R
2
t
= R. Then P
i
t
= 1 +R and
dR
t
=
 
R
c
,
1
2
R(1 +R)(
c
t
)
2
,
1
2
(1 +R)
R
(
2
1t
+ 
2
2t
)

2
1t
X
i

c
i
t
C
t
(
i
2t
)
2

!
dt
+(1 +R)
c
t

2t

1t
X
i

c
i
t
C
t

i
2t

dt,
c
2
t
C
t
d
t
y , 
t
while (
t
, r
t
)=
1t
= R
c
t
. But we also have 0 =
P
i
A
i
t

i
2t
= ,
1
R
P
i
(c
i
t
=C
t
)
i
2t
: Substituting gives
the expression in the Corollary.
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7.2 Appendix B: a formulation of the lagrangian problem.
Let H be the set of nonnegative, continuous, adapted and bounded processes, and let L
1
be
the space of essentially bounded, continuous and adapted processes. Assume e, 2 H. The
optimization problem can be formulated as
J = sup
c2H
U (c) s:t:
A (c)  E

Z
T
0

t
(c
t
, e
t
) dt

,X
0
 0
V (c)  E

Z
T
t

s
(c
s
, e
s
) ds j F
t

 0
where V : H ! L
1
. Denote by ba the set of bounded additive set functions, i.e. the dual space
of L
1
(Dunford and Schwartz (1958), IV.6), and let ba

be the positive cone of ba. Since H is a
linear vector space, L
1
is a normed vector space whose positive cone has a nonempty interior, U
is concave, A and V are convex and J is nite, the saddle point theorem (i.e. Luenberger (1969),
Theorem 8.1 and Corollary 1) gives
J =sup
c2H
inf
z2ba

;2R
+
U (c) + hV (c) ; zi+A (c)  (84)
where ha; bi is the value of the functional b evaluated at a. Now from Yosida and Hewitt ((1952),
1.23 and 2.3) it follows that 8z 2 ba

8x 2 L
1
, there exist a nonnegative countably additive
measure 
m
and pure charge (or a nonnegative purely nitely additive set function) 
ch
such that
hV (c) ; zi =
Z

[0;T ]
V (c) d
m
+
Z

[0;T ]
V (c) d
ch
:
>From Yosida and Hewitt (1952, 1.22), there exists a sequence of predictable sets fS
i
g such
that lim
i"1
PLeb(S
i
) = 0, lim
i"1

m
(S
i
) = 0 and 
ch
(S
c
i
) = 0 8i. Now construct the decreasing
sequence of predictable sets A
i
=
i
\
n=1
S
n
. Clearly, lim
i"1
PLeb(A
i
) = 0 and lim
i"1

m
(A
i
) = 0.
In addition, since A
c
i
=
i
[
n=1
S
c
n
, we have 
ch
(A
c
i
) 
i
P
n=1

ch
(S
c
n
) = 0 and thus 
ch
(A
c
i
) = 0 8i.
Consider the auxilliary problems
J
i
=sup
c2H
inf
z2ba

;2R
+
U

1
f
A
c
i
g
c

+
D
V

1
f
A
c
i
g
c

; z
E
+A

1
f
A
c
i
g
c

 (85)
and let O be the set of predictable sets in 
[0; T ]. Denote by c
i
,z
i
and 
i
the solutions of (85) for
any i. Since 
ch
(A
c
i
) = 0 8i, and c is bounded,
D
V

1
f
A
c
i
g
c

; z
i
E
=
R

[0;T ]
V

1
f
A
c
i
g
c

d
m
i
for
some countably additive measure 
m
i
and 8c 2 H. Dene the nonnegative measure 
i
on [0; T ] as
follows: (P  
i
) (E) = (P  Leb) (E) 8E 2 O such that (P  Leb) (E) 6= 0 and (P  
i
) (E) =

m
i
(E) 8E 2 O such that (P  Leb) (E) = 0. Since by construction 
m
i
is absolutely continuous
with respect to P  
i
; by the Radon-Nikodym theorem (i.e. Dunford and Schwartz (1958),
III.10.2), one can write
D
V

1
f
A
c
i
g
c

; z
i
E
=
Z
V

1
f
A
c
i
g
c

d
m
i
=
Z
V

1
f
A
c
i
g
c

f
i
d (P  
i
) = E

Z
T
0
V
t

1
f
A
c
i
g
c

f
i
d
i

for some nonnegative integrable function f
i
. Dening the nonegative and nondecreasing process

i
t
=
R
t
0
f
i
s
d
i
, we can then write
D
V

1
f
A
c
i
g
c

; z
i
E
= E

R
T
0
V
t

1
f
A
c
i
g
c

d
i
t

8c 2 H.
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By the constraint qualication condition (Luenberger (1969) Theorem 8.1)
D
V

1
f
A
c
i
g
c
i

; z
i
E
= 0 and A

1
f
A
c
i
g
c


i
= 0 8i. Now, since all c are bounded and the sequence fA
c
i
g is increasing,
by monotone convergence we have J
i
" J and thus
J =sup
c2H
inf
2N , 2R
+
U (c) +E

Z
T
0
V
t
(c) d
t

+A (c) (86)
where N denotes the set of adapted, nonnegative and nondecreasing processes. Since
E

Z
T
0
V
t
(c) d
t

= E
Z
T
0
Z
T
t

s
(c
s
, e
s
) dsd
t
integrating by parts and taking into account that  is nondecreasing and therefore of nite vari-
ation, we have (dropping the argument c of V for convenience)
0 = V
T

T
=
Z
T
0
V
t
d
t
+
Z
T
0

t
dV
t
+ [V; ]
T
=
Z
T
0
V
t
d
t
+
Z
T
0

t
dV
t
(87)
write V
t
= E

R
T
0

s
(c
s
, e
s
) ds j F
t

,
R
t
0

s
(c
s
, e
s
) ds: Since the integrands are bounded, by
the martingale representation theorem we can write dV
t
= , (c
t
, e
t
) 
t
dt+
t
dW
t
where 
t
is an
integrable adapted process. Substituting in (87) gives
Z
T
0
V
t
d
t
= ,
Z
T
0

t

t
dW
t
+
Z
T
0

t
(c
t
, e
t
) 
t
dt
and taking expectations, we obtain E

R
T
0
V
t
d
t

= E

R
T
0

t
(c
t
, e
t
) 
t
dt

so that (86) becomes
J =sup
c
inf
;
U(c) + 

X
0
,E
Z
T
0

t
(c
t
, e
t
) dt

+E

Z
T
0

t
(c
t
, e
t
) 
t
dt

: (88)
Taking the relevant (Gateaux) derivatives of (88), leads to the rst order conditions (20).
7.3 Appendix C: equilibrium with N agents.
Consider the economy with N
u
unconstrained and N
c
constrained agents, N
u
+ N
c
= N . To
prove existence of equilibrium we need to solve
e
t
=
X
j2U
I
j
(y
j

t
) +
X
j2C
I
j
((y
j
, 
j
t
)
t
) (89)

t
X
j
t
= E

Z
T
t

s
[I
j
((y
j
, 
j
s
)
s
), e
j
s
]ds j F
t

 0; j 2 C; (90)
X
j
t
d
j
t
= 0; 
j
nondecreasing null at 0, j 2 C (91)
E
Z
T
0

s
[I
j
(y
j

s
), e
j
s
]ds = n
j
S
0
; j 2 U (92)
E
Z
T
0

s
[I
j
((y
j
, 
j
s
)
s
), e
j
s
]ds = n
j
S
0
; j 2 C (93)
Appealing to Walras law we can set the multiplier of one unconstrained agent, say agent 1,
equal to 1: y
1
= 1: Dening y  (y
2
; :::; y
N
) and   (
2
; :::; 
N
) where 
j
 0 for j 2 U
34
we obtain from the goods market clearing condition (89) 
t
= u
c
(e
t
; y , 
t
)  g
t
(y , 
t
) where
g
t
() :
N
N
j=2
[0; y
j
] ! R
+
is the unique solution of e
t
=
P
j2U
I
j
(y
j
g
t
(y , 
t
)) +
P
j2C
I
j
((y
j
,

j
t
)g
t
(y , 
t
)): Substituting in (90)-(93) and dening the process h
j
t
()
h
j
t
(x) = g
t
(x)[I
j
(x
j
g
t
(x)), e
j
t
] (94)
with the convention x
j
= y
j
for j 2 U; leaves us with the system

t
X
j
t
= E

Z
T
t
h
j
s
(y , 
s
)ds j F
t

 0; j 2 C (95)
X
j
t
d
j
t
= 0; 
j
nondecreasing null at 0, j 2 C (96)
E
Z
T
0
h
j
s
(y , 
s
)ds = n
j
S
0
; j 2 C [ Un1: (97)
The functions g and h have the following properties
Lemma 21 For all t 2 [0; T ] the function g
t
() :
N
N
j=2
[0; y
j
]! [g
t
(y);1) satises
(i) g
t
() is strictly decreasing with respect to each argument x
j
(ii) lim
x
j
!0
g
t
(x) =1
(iii) lim
x!y
g
t
(x) = g
t
(y) > 0
(iv)
@g
t
(x)
@x
j
= ,
I
0
j
(x
j
g
t
(x))g
t
(x)
I
0
1
(g
t
(x))+
P
i6=1
I
0
i
(x
i
g
t
(x))x
i
:
Proof of Lemma 21: The function g
t
() is continuously dierentiable over its domain: An
application of the Implicit Function Theorem yields (iv). Property (i) follows from (iv). When
x
j
! 0 we have I
j
(x
j
g
t
(x))!1 for all g
t
(x) nite. Since the left hand side of (89) is nite and
I
j
() is nonnegative for all j the limit (ii) holds. Property (iii) is straightforward.
Lemma 22 For all t 2 [0; T ] the function h
j
t
() :
N
N
j=2
[0; y
j
]! [h
j
t
(y); 0] satises
(i) 9x
j
2 (0; y
j
) such that h
j
t
(x) is strictly decreasing for x
j
< x
j
(ii) lim
x
j
!0
h
j
t
(x) =1
(iii) lim
x!y
h
j
t
(x) = h
j
t
(y) > (<)0, I
j
(y
j
g
t
(y)), e
j
s
> (<)0:
(iv)
@h
j
t
(x)
@x
j
=
@g
t
(x)
@x
j
[I
j
(x
j
g
t
(x)) , e
j
t
] + g
t
(x)I
0
j
(x
j
g
t
(x))[g
t
(x) + x
j
@g
t
(x)
@x
j
]:
Proof of Lemma 22: Properties (ii), (iii) and (iv) are straightforward. To prove (i) note that
(89) and property (ii) of lemma 21 imply I
j
(x
j
g
t
(x)) , e
j
t
 0 for x
j
suciently low. Let x
j
be
such that I
j
(x
j
g
t
(x

)), e
j
t
= 0: Property (iv) of Lemma 21 implies
g
t
(x) + x
j
@g
t
(x)
@x
j
=
[I
0
1
(g
t
(x)) +
P
i6=1;j
I
0
i
(x
i
g
t
(x))x
i
]g
t
(x)
I
0
1
(g
t
(x)) +
P
i6=1
I
0
i
(x
i
g
t
(x))x
i
> 0:
Hence I
j
(x
j
g
t
(x)) , e
j
t
is decreasing and for x
j
< x
j
we have I
j
(x
j
g
t
(x)) , e
j
t
 0: Since
@g
t
(x)=@x
j
< 0 it then follows from (iv) that @h
j
t
(x)=@x
j
< 0 for x
j
< x
j
:
Consider now the N
c
-dimensional vector process
F
t
(y;
t
) = E

Z
T
t
h
s
(y ,

t;s
)ds j F
t

; t 2 [0; T ]; (98)
where 

t;s
= sup
v2[t;s]

v
. We need to solve the auxiliary problem, for all t 2 [0; T ]
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Ft
(y;
t
)  0 (99)
F
t
(y;
t
)  d
t
 0 (100)
where * denotes multiplication component by component of two vectors. Label the N
c
components
of (99)-(100) by j = 1; :::; N
c
: Consider the rst component of (99)-(100). The problem of solving
for 
1
taking y and 
i
; i 6= 1 as given is identical to the problem that we solved before for the
case of 2 agents. By Lemma 22 the integrand h
1
t
(x) has the required properties. Hence

1
(y;
 (1)
) = F
 1
t
(y; 0;
 (1)
)1
fF
t
(y;0;
 (1)
t
)<0g
(101)
where 
 (1)
 (
2
; :::;
N
c
). Consider next the second component of (99)-(100) where 
1
(y;
 (1)
)
has been substituted in place of 
1
and where y and 
i
; i 6= 1; 2 are taken as given. If
the same construction can be carried out we can dene a new process 
2
(y;
 (1;2)
) where

 (1;2)
 (
3
; :::;
N
c
). Substituting in the rst process yields

1
(y;
 (1;2)
)  
1
(y;
2
(y;
 (1;2)
);
 (1;2)
):
Proceeding inductively over j = 1; :::; N
c
, we can, in principle, construct the array of processes

(j)
(y;
 (1;::;j)
)  (
1
(y;
 (1;::;j)
); :::;
j
(y;
 (1;::;j)
))
where 
 (1;::;j)
 (
j+1
; :::;
N
c
) for j = 1; :::; N
c
: Our next lemma establishes the validity of
this construction.
Lemma 23 Suppose that 
(j 1)
(y;
 (1;::;j 1)
) exists, for some j = 1; :::; N
c
. Then 
(j)
(y;
 (1;::;j)
)
exists.
Proof of Lemma 23: To simplify notation dene

x
i
(x
 (1;::;j 1)
)  y
i
,
i
(y;
 (1;::;j 1)
); for i = 1; :::; j , 1
x
(j 1)
(x
 (1;::;j 1)
)  (x
1
(x
 (1;::;j 1)
); :::; x
j 1
(x
 (1;::;j 1)
)) = y
(j 1)
,
(j 1)
(y;
 (1;::;j 1)
)
where x
 (1;::;j 1)
= (x
j
; :::; x
N
c
)
) is taken as given and consider the map
h
j
(x)  h
j
(x
1
(x
 (1;::;j 1)
); :::; x
j 1
(x
 (1;::;j 1)
); x
j
; :::; x
N
c
)
Suppose that x
j
t
! 0. Since x
j
is a nonincreasing process we must have x
j
v
! 0 for all v 2 [t; T ].
Property (ii) of Lemma 21 then implies that g
v
(x) ! 1 for all v 2 [t; T ]: Furthermore since the
rst j , 1 conditions of (99)-(100) hold by denition of the maps x
i
(x
 (1;::;j 1)
), i = 1; :::; j , 1 it
must also be that
x
1
v
(y; x
 (1;::;j 1)
)! 0; ::; x
j 1
v
(y; x
 (1;::;j 1)
)! 0; for all v 2 [t; T ]
since otherwise h
j
v
(x
j
)! ,1; for all v 2 [t; T ]. In fact F
i
v
! 0 for all v 2 [t; T ] and i = 1; :::; j,1;
i.e. the constraints must be binding, on the rst j , 1 agents and
I(x
i
t
(y; x
 (1;::;j 1)
)g
t
(x)), e
i
t
! 0; for all i = 1; :::; j , 1:
The market clearing condition (89) then implies I(x
j
v
g
v
(x)),e
j
v
 0. Thus h
j
!1: Continuity of
h
j
implies that there exists an x
j
such that F
j
t
 0: The existence of 
(j)
(y;
 (1;::;j)
) follows:
An immediate consequence of the previous lemma is the following result.
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Theorem 24 For each y > 0 the system (95)-(96) has a solution (y) = (
1
(y); :::; 
N
c
(y)):
Proof of Theorem 24: Lemma 23 and the existence of 
1
(y;
 (1)
) implies that we can con-
struct a vector process (y) which satises (99)-(100). The process (y) is 
t
(y) = 

0;t
(y):
Lemma 25 There exists y

= (y
2
; :::; y
N
) 2 (0;1)
N 1
such that
E
Z
T
0
h
j
s
(y

, 
s
(y

))ds = n
j
S
0
; j 2 C [ Un1 (102)
where (y) = 
(N)
(y):
Proof of Lemma 25: This follows from the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz Theorem. See
Karatzas, Lakner, Lehoczky and Shreve (1991).
Summarizing we have proved the following result
Theorem 26 The system (95)-(97) has a solution 

= (
1
(y

); :::; 
N
(y

)) where 
t
(y) = 

0;t
(y)
solves (95)-(96) and y

is the solution of (102).
7.4 Appendix D: computation based on a binomial approximation.
We consider now a simple binomial model with underlying underlying uncertainty process z and
parameters u and d, and probability p.
p zu
z
%
&
1, p zd
The initial value is z
0
and the tree has N steps. Agents endowments are functionals of the
trajectories of the random walk z. Since prices and the interest rate are endogenous the risk
neutral probability is given by some measure q  fq
n
: n = 1; :::; Ng and the interest rate by some
process r. The state price density satises
r
n

n+1
= 
n

q
n
=p
(1, q
n
)=(1 , p)
: (103)
Equilibrium in the 2-agents economy is the solution of

n
X
2
n
= E
 
N
X
i=n
h
i
(y , 
i
) j F
n
!
 0; n 2 f1; :::; Ng (104)
X
2
n

n
= 0;  nondecreasing null at 0, n 2 f1; :::; Ng (105)
E
N
X
i=0
h
i
(y , 
i
) = 0 (106)
where g is constructed from the aggregate demand and h
n
(x) = g
n
(x)[I
2
(xg
n
(x)) , e
2
n
]: In order
to solve for equilibrium we introduce an auxiliary process  and the map
A
n
(y;  
n
)  E
 
N
X
i=n+1
h
i
(y ,max( 
i
; :::;  
n
)) j F
n
!
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Consider now the backward equation
 
n
=

0 if h
n
(y) +A
n
(y; 0)  0
max

y , h
 1
n
(,A
n
(y;  
n
)) ; 0
	
if h
n
(y) +A
n
(y; 0) < 0
(107)
for n = 1; :::; N subject to the boundary condition
 
N
=

0 if h
N
(y)  0
y , h
 1
N
(0) if h
N
(y) < 0
(108)
In these equations h
 1
n
(x) is the largest value of the argument of h
n
that reaches the level x:
It is easy to verify that the process  can be recovered from the solution of the backward equation
as 
n
= max( 
n
; :::;  
1
): Our next lemma establishes the existence of the process  :
Lemma 27 The backward equation (107)-(108) has a unique solution  
n
(y).
Proof of Lemma 27: Suppose that h
n
(y) + A
n
(y; 0) < 0: Then the recursive equation  
n
=
y,h
 1
n
(,A
n
(y;  
n
))is equivalent to h
n
(y, 
n
)+A
n
( 
n
) = 0:As in appendix A it can be veried
that the left hand side of this equation is strictly increasing with respect to  
n
for y, 
n
suciently
small and that it converges to innity as y ,  
n
goes to zero. The result follows by continuity.
The process  is then given by 
n
(y) = max( 
n
(y); :::;  
1
(y));where (y) denotes the solution
for a given constant y: We have
Lemma 28 The map (y) has the following properties (i) (y) is a nondecreasing function of y,
(ii) lim
y!0
(0) = 0, (iii) lim
y!1
(y) =1, (iv) lim
y!1
y , (y)  0:
Lemma 29 There exists a multiplier y

such that h
0
(y

) + A
0
(y

; 0) = 0: The nondecreasing
multiplier (y

) is 
n
(y

) = max( 
n
(y

); :::;  
1
(y

)):
Proof of Lemma 29: The multiplier for the date zero budget constraint satises
h
0
(y) +E
 
N
X
i=1
h
i
(y , 
i
(y))
!
= 0: (109)
Using Lemma 28 above and the properties of the map h it can be veried that a solution exists .
The equilibrium state price density is then 
n
= g
n
(y , 
n
(y)): It generates the equations
8
>
<
>
>
:
r
n
g
u
n+1
(y 
n+1
(y))
g
n
(y 
n
(y))
p = q
n
r
n
g
d
n+1
(y 
n+1
(y))
g
n
(y 
n
(y))
(1, p) = 1, q
n
:
Solving this system for r and q yields
q
n
= g
u
n+1
(y , 
n+1
(y))p
h
g
d
n+1
(y , 
n+1
(y)) + [g
u
n+1
(y , 
n+1
(y)), g
d
n+1
(y , 
n+1
(y))]p
i
 1
r
n
= g
n
(y , 
n
(y))
h
g
d
n+1
(y , 
n+1
(y)) + [g
u
n+1
(y , 
n+1
(y)), g
d
n+1
(y , 
n+1
(y))]p
i
 1
:
Using the liquid wealth process and dening V
j
n
= g
n
(y , 
n
(y))
 1
E
n
[
P
N
i=n
g
i
(y , 
i
(y))e
j
i
] we
can now write
38
rn
X
j
n
+ 
j
n
(u
n
, r
n
), c
j
n
+ e
j
n
+ r
n
V
j
n
+ (1, q
n
)(V
ju
n+1
, V
jd
n+1
), e
j
n
= (
u
n+1
)
 1
(
G
j
n+1
,
n
X
i=0
g
i
(y , 
i
(y))I
j
((y , 
i
(y))g
i
(y , 
i
(y)))
)
and a similar equation for the down step. Using c
j
n
= I
j
(y , 
n
) and
r
n

u
n+1
= 
n
 (q
n
=p) = (X
j
n
+ V
j
n
)
 1
[G
j
n
,
n 1
X
i=0
g
i
(y , 
i
(y))I
j
((y , 
i
(y))g
i
(y , 
i
(y)))](q
n
=p)
we then get the optimal portfolio

j
n
= (X
j
n
+ V
j
n
)
r
n
u
n
, r
n

J
j
n;n+1
p
q
n
, 1

+
I
j
(y , 
n
(y))
u
n
, r
n
,
(1, q
n
)(V
ju
n+1
, V
jd
n+1
)
u
n
, r
n
where V
j
n
is dened above and
J
j
n;n+1
=
[G
j
n+1
,
P
n
i=0
g
i
(y , 
i
(y))I
j
((y , 
i
(y))g
i
(y , 
i
(y)))]
[G
j
n
,
P
n 1
i=0
g
i
(y , 
i
(y))I
j
((y , 
i
(y))g
i
(y , 
i
(y)))]
:
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